[11] Cum illo vero quis neget actum esse
praeclare?
Indeed, who would deny that things turned out
splendidly for him?
Nisi enim, quod ille minime putabat,
immortalitatem optare vellet, quid non adeptus est quod homini fas esset
optare?
For unless he wished to desire immortality,
which he least thought of, what did he not obtain that it was right for a man
to desire?
Qui summam spem civium, quam de eo iam puero
habuerant, continuo adulescens incredibili virtute superavit, qui consulatum
petivit numquam, factus consul est bis, primum ante tempus, iterum sibi suo
tempore, rei publicae paene sero, qui duabus urbibus eversis inimicissimis huic
imperio non modo praesentia verum etiam futura bella delevit.
He, who, while still a youth, immediately
surpassed with incredible virtue the highest hopes of the citizens which they
had held for him even as a boy, who never sought the consulship, yet was made
consul twice, first before the proper time, again at his own proper time
(almost too late for the republic), who, by overthrowing two cities most
hostile to this empire, destroyed not only present but also future wars.
Quid dicam de moribus facillimis, de pietate
in matrem, liberalitate in sorores, bonitate in suos, iustitia in omnes?
What shall I say about his most agreeable
manners, his piety towards his mother, his generosity towards his sisters, his
kindness towards his own, his justice towards all?
Nota sunt vobis.
These things are known to you.
Quam autem civitati carus fuerit, maerore
funeris indicatum est.
Moreover, how dear he was to the state was
indicated by the grief at his funeral.
Quid igitur hunc paucorum annorum accessio
iuvare potuisset?
What then could the addition of a few years
have helped him?
Senectus enim quamvis non sit gravis, ut memini
Catonem anno ante quam est mortuus mecum et cum Scipione disserere, tamen
aufert eam viriditatem in qua etiam nunc erat Scipio.
For old age, although it is not burdensome, as
I remember Cato discussing with me and Scipio the year before he died, nevertheless
takes away that vigor in which Scipio still was even then.
[12] Quam ob rem vita quidem talis fuit vel
fortuna vel gloria, ut nihil posset accedere, moriendi autem sensum celeritas
abstulit; quo de genere mortis difficile dictu est; quid homines suspicentur,
videtis; hoc vere tamen licet dicere, P. Scipioni ex multis diebus, quos in
vita celeberrimos laetissimosque viderit, illum diem clarissimum fuisse, cum
senatu dimisso domum reductus ad vesperum est a patribus conscriptis, populo
Romano, sociis et Latinis, pridie quam excessit e vita, ut ex tam alto
dignitatis gradu ad superos videatur deos potius quam ad inferos
pervenisse.
Therefore, his life indeed was such in terms
of fortune and glory that nothing could be added to it, and the swiftness of
his death took away the sensation of dying; concerning this kind of death it is
difficult to speak; what people suspect, you see; but truly it is permissible
to say this, that for Publius Scipio, out of the many most celebrated and
joyful days he had seen in his life, that day was the most illustrious, when,
the senate dismissed, he was led back home in the evening by the conscript
fathers, the Roman people, the allies and Latins, the day before he departed
from life, so that from such a high degree of dignity he seems to have reached
the gods above rather than those below.
[13] Neque enim assentior iis qui haec nuper
disserere coeperunt, cum corporibus simul animos interire atque omnia morte
deleri; plus apud me antiquorum auctoritas valet, vel nostrorum maiorum, qui
mortuis tam religiosa iura tribuerunt, quod non fecissent profecto si nihil ad
eos pertinere arbitrarentur, vel eorum qui in hac terra fuerunt magnamque
Graeciam, quae nunc quidem deleta est, tum florebat, institutis et praeceptis
suis erudierunt, vel eius qui Apollinis oraculo sapientissimus est iudicatus,
qui non tum hoc, tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed semper idem, animos hominum
esse divinos, iisque, cum ex corpore excessissent, reditum in caelum patere,
optimoque et iustissimo cuique expeditissimum.
For I do not agree with those who have
recently begun to argue this, that souls perish along with bodies and that all
things are destroyed by death; the authority of the ancients holds more sway
with me, either of our ancestors, who attributed such sacred rights to the
dead, which they certainly would not have done if they thought nothing
pertained to them, or of those who were in this land and educated Magna
Graecia, which is indeed now destroyed but then flourished, with their
institutions and precepts, or of him who was judged wisest by the oracle of
Apollo, who did not say now this, now that, as in most cases, but always the
same thing, that the souls of men are divine, and that for them, when they have
departed from the body, a return to heaven is open, and most expeditious for
every best and most just person.
[14] Quod idem Scipioni videbatur, qui quidem,
quasi praesagiret, perpaucis ante mortem diebus, cum et Philus et Manilius
adesset et alii plures, tuque etiam, Scaevola, mecum venisses, triduum
disseruit de re publica; cuius disputationis fuit extremum fere de
immortalitate animorum, quae se in quiete per visum ex Africano audisse
dicebat.
This same thing seemed true to Scipio, who
indeed, as if he foretold it, a very few days before his death, when both
Philus and Manilius were present and many others, and you too, Scaevola, had
come with me, discoursed for three days about the republic; the almost final
part of which discussion was about the immortality of souls, which he said he
had heard from Africanus in a vision during sleep.
Id si ita est, ut optimi cuiusque animus in
morte facillime evolet tamquam e custodia vinclisque corporis, cui censemus
cursum ad deos faciliorem fuisse quam Scipioni?
If this is so, that the soul of every best man
flies forth most easily in death as if from the prison and chains of the body,
for whom do we think the path to the gods was easier than for Scipio?
Quocirca maerere hoc eius eventu vereor ne
invidi magis quam amici sit.
Therefore, to grieve at this outcome of his, I
fear it may be more characteristic of an envious person than a friend.
Sin autem illa veriora, ut idem interitus sit
animorum et corporum nec ullus sensus maneat, ut nihil boni est in morte, sic
certe nihil mali; sensu enim amisso fit idem, quasi natus non esset omnino,
quem tamen esse natum et nos gaudemus et haec civitas dum erit laetabitur.
But if those things are truer, that there is
the same destruction of souls and bodies and no sensation remains, just as
there is nothing good in death, so certainly there is nothing bad; for with
sensation lost, it is the same as if one had not been born at all, yet that he
was born both we rejoice and this state, as long as it exists, will be glad.
[15] Quam ob rem cum illo quidem, ut supra
dixi, actum optime est, mecum incommodius, quem fuerat aequius, ut prius
introieram, sic prius exire de vita.
Therefore, as I said above, it certainly
turned out best for him, but less conveniently for me, for whom it would have
been fairer to depart from life as I had entered it, earlier.
Sed tamen recordatione nostrae amicitiae sic
fruor ut beate vixisse videar, quia cum Scipione vixerim, quocum mihi coniuncta
cura de publica re et de privata fuit, quocum et domus fuit et militia communis
et, id in quo est omnis vis amicitiae, voluntatum, studiorum, sententiarum
summa consensio.
But nevertheless, I enjoy the recollection of
our friendship so much that I seem to have lived blessedly, because I lived
with Scipio, with whom I had a shared concern for public and private matters,
with whom both my home and military service were common, and, that in which all
the power of friendship lies, the utmost agreement of wills, pursuits, and
opinions.
Itaque non tam ista me sapientiae, quam modo
Fannius commemoravit, fama delectat, falsa praesertim, quam quod amicitiae
nostrae memoriam spero sempiternam fore, idque eo mihi magis est cordi, quod ex
omnibus saeculis vix tria aut quattuor nominantur paria amicorum; quo in genere
sperare videor Scipionis et Laeli amicitiam notam posteritati fore.
And so that reputation for wisdom, which
Fannius just mentioned, does not delight me so much, especially since it is
false, as the hope that the memory of our friendship will be everlasting, and
this is all the more dear to my heart, because out of all ages scarcely three
or four pairs of friends are named; in which category I seem to hope that the
friendship of Scipio and Laelius will be known to posterity.
[16] Fannius: Istuc quidem, Laeli, ita necesse
est.
Fannius: That indeed, Laelius, must
necessarily be so.
Sed quoniam amicitiae mentionem fecisti et
sumus otiosi, pergratum mihi feceris, spero item Scaevolae, si quem ad modum
soles de ceteris rebus, cum ex te quaeruntur, sic de amicitia disputaris quid
sentias, qualem existimes, quae praecepta des.
But since you have made mention of friendship
and we are at leisure, you will do me a great favor, and I hope likewise
Scaevola, if, just as you are accustomed to do concerning other matters, when
they are asked of you, so concerning friendship you would discuss what you
feel, what kind you judge it to be, what precepts you give.
Scaevola: Mihi vero erit gratum; atque id
ipsum cum tecum agere conarer, Fannius antevertit.
Scaevola: To me, indeed, it will be pleasing;
and Fannius anticipated that very thing when I was trying to urge it with
you.
Quam ob rem utrique nostrum gratum admodum
feceris.
Therefore you will have done something very
pleasing to both of us.
[17] Laelius: Ego vero non gravarer, si mihi
ipse confiderem; nam et praeclara res est et sumus, ut dixit Fannius,
otiosi.
Laelius: Indeed, I would not be reluctant, if
I trusted myself; for it is both a splendid subject and we are, as Fannius
said, at leisure.
Sed quis ego sum?
But who am I?
aut quae est in me facultas?
Or what ability is in me?
Doctorum est ista consuetudo, eaque Graecorum,
ut iis ponatur de quo disputent quamvis subito; magnum opus est egetque
exercitatione non parva.
That custom belongs to learned men, and
particularly to Greeks, that a topic for discussion be given to them however
suddenly; it is a great task and requires no small practice.
Quam ob rem quae disputari de amicitia
possunt, ab eis censeo petatis qui ista profitentur; ego vos hortari tantum
possum ut amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis anteponatis; nihil est enim tam
naturae aptum, tam conveniens ad res vel secundas vel adversas.
Therefore, I advise that you seek what can be
discussed about friendship from those who profess such things; I can only
exhort you to prefer friendship to all human affairs; for nothing is so suited
to nature, so convenient for circumstances both prosperous and adverse.
[18] Sed hoc primum sentio, nisi in bonis
amicitiam esse non posse; neque id ad vivum reseco, ut illi qui haec subtilius
disserunt, fortasse vere, sed ad communem utilitatem parum; negant enim
quemquam esse virum bonum nisi sapientem.
But this I feel first, that friendship cannot
exist except among good men; nor do I cut this to the quick, as those do who
discuss these matters more subtly, perhaps truly, but too little for common
utility; for they deny that anyone is a good man unless he is wise.
Sit ita sane; sed eam sapientiam
interpretantur quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus, nos autem ea quae sunt
in usu vitaque communi, non ea quae finguntur aut optantur, spectare
debemus.
Let it be so indeed; but they interpret that
wisdom which no mortal has yet attained, while we, however, ought to look at
those things which are in common use and life, not those which are imagined or
wished for.
Numquam ego dicam C. Fabricium, M'. Curium,
Ti. Coruncanium, quos sapientes nostri maiores iudicabant, ad istorum normam
fuisse sapientes.
I will never say that Gaius Fabricius, Manius
Curius, Tiberius Coruncanius, whom our ancestors judged wise, were wise
according to the standard of those men.
Quare sibi habeant sapientiae nomen et
invidiosum et obscurum; concedant ut viri boni fuerint.
Therefore let them keep the name of wisdom for
themselves, both invidious and obscure; let them concede that these men were
good.
Ne id quidem facient, negabunt id nisi
sapienti posse concedi.
They will not even do that, they will deny
that it can be conceded to anyone but the wise.
[19] Agamus igitur pingui, ut aiunt,
Minerva.
Let us proceed then, as they say, with a 'fat
Minerva' (i.e., with common sense).
Qui ita se gerunt, ita vivunt ut eorum probetur
fides, integritas, aequitas, liberalitas, nec sit in eis ulla cupiditas,
libido, audacia, sintque magna constantia, ut ii fuerunt modo quos nominavi,
hos viros bonos, ut habiti sunt, sic etiam appellandos putemus, quia sequantur,
quantum homines possunt, naturam optimam bene vivendi ducem.
Those who conduct themselves in such a way,
who live in such a way that their trustworthiness, integrity, fairness,
generosity are approved, and there is in them no greed, lust, or audacity, and
who are of great constancy, as those were whom I just named, these men we
should consider good, and call them so, just as they have been regarded,
because they follow, as far as humans can, nature, the best guide for living
well.
Sic enim mihi perspicere videor, ita natos
esse nos ut inter omnes esset societas quaedam, maior autem ut quisque proxime
accederet.
For thus I seem to perceive, that we were born
in such a way that there should be a certain fellowship among all, but a
greater one as each person came closer.
Itaque cives potiores quam peregrini,
propinqui quam alieni; cum his enim amicitiam natura ipsa peperit; sed ea non
satis habet firmitatis.
Therefore citizens are preferred to
foreigners, relatives to strangers; for with these, nature itself has produced friendship;
but it does not have enough firmness.
Namque hoc praestat amicitia propinquitati,
quod ex propinquitate benevolentia tolli potest, ex amicitia non potest;
sublata enim benevolentia amicitiae nomen tollitur, propinquitatis manet.
For friendship surpasses kinship in this, that
goodwill can be removed from kinship, but not from friendship; for if goodwill
is removed, the name of friendship is removed, but that of kinship
remains.
[20] Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit, ex hoc
intellegi maxime potest, quod ex infinita societate generis humani, quam
conciliavit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est et adducta in angustum ut omnis
caritas aut inter duos aut inter paucos iungeretur.
Moreover, how great the power of friendship
is, can be understood especially from this: because from the infinite society
of the human race, which nature itself reconciled, the matter is so contracted
and brought into a narrow compass that all affection is joined either between
two or among a few.
Est enim amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium
divinarum humanarumque rerum cum benevolentia et caritate consensio; qua quidem
haud scio an excepta sapientia nihil melius homini sit a dis immortalibus
datum.
For friendship is nothing else than a complete
agreement on all divine and human matters, accompanied by goodwill and
affection; than which, indeed, I hardly know if anything better has been given
to man by the immortal gods, wisdom alone excepted.
Divitias alii praeponunt, bonam alii
valetudinem, alii potentiam, alii honores, multi etiam voluptates.
Some prefer riches, others good health, others
power, others honors, many also pleasures.
Beluarum hoc quidem extremum, illa autem
superiora caduca et incerta, posita non tam in consiliis nostris quam in
fortunae temeritate.
The latter indeed is characteristic of beasts,
while the former things are fleeting and uncertain, placed not so much in our
counsels as in the randomness of fortune.
Qui autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt,
praeclare illi quidem, sed haec ipsa virtus amicitiam et gignit et continet nec
sine virtute amicitia esse ullo pacto potest.
But those who place the highest good in
virtue, they indeed do so splendidly, but this very virtue both engenders and
maintains friendship, nor can friendship exist in any way without virtue.
[21] Iam virtutem ex consuetudine vitae
sermonisque nostri interpretemur nec eam, ut quidam docti, verborum
magnificentia metiamur virosque bonos eos, qui habentur, numeremus, Paulos,
Catones, Galos, Scipiones, Philos; his communis vita contenta est; eos autem
omittamus, qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur.
Now let us interpret virtue according to the
custom of our life and speech, and not measure it, as some learned men do, by
magnificence of words, and let us count as good men those who are so
considered: the Pauluses, Catos, Galluses, Scipios, Philos; with these, common
life is content; but let us omit those who are found nowhere at all.
[22] Talis igitur inter viros amicitia tantas
opportunitates habet quantas vix queo dicere.
Therefore, such friendship among men has
opportunities so great that I can scarcely express them.
Principio qui potest esse vita 'vitalis', ut
ait Ennius, quae non in amici mutua benevolentia conquiescit?
In the first place, how can life be 'living,'
as Ennius says, which does not find rest in the mutual goodwill of a
friend?
Quid dulcius quam habere quicum omnia audeas
sic loqui ut tecum?
What is sweeter than to have someone with whom
you dare to speak of everything as if with yourself?
Qui esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus,
nisi haberes, qui illis aeque ac tu ipse gauderet?
What so great fruit would there be in
prosperous circumstances, if you did not have one who would rejoice in them as
much as you yourself?
Adversas vero ferre difficile esset sine eo
qui illas gravius etiam quam tu ferret.
Indeed, it would be difficult to bear adverse
circumstances without one who would bear them even more gravely than you.
Denique ceterae res quae expetuntur opportunae
sunt singulae rebus fere singulis, divitiae, ut utare, opes, ut colare,
honores, ut laudere, voluptates, ut gaudeas, valetudo, ut dolore careas et
muneribus fungare corporis; amicitia res plurimas continet; quoquo te verteris,
praesto est, nullo loco excluditur, numquam intempestiva, numquam molesta est;
itaque non aqua, non igni, ut aiunt, locis pluribus utimur quam amicitia.
Finally, other things which are sought are
each opportune for almost single purposes: riches, that you may use them;
power, that you may be honored; honors, that you may be praised; pleasures,
that you may rejoice; health, that you may be free from pain and perform the
functions of the body; friendship contains very many things; wherever you turn
yourself, it is present, it is excluded from no place, it is never untimely,
never troublesome; and so, as they say, we do not use water or fire in more
places than friendship.
Neque ego nunc de vulgari aut de mediocri,
quae tamen ipsa et delectat et prodest, sed de vera et perfecta loquor, qualis
eorum qui pauci nominantur fuit.
Nor am I now speaking of common or mediocre
friendship, which nevertheless itself both delights and benefits, but of true
and perfect friendship, such as was that of those who are few in number.
Nam et secundas res splendidiores facit
amicitia et adversas partiens communicansque leviores.
For friendship both makes prosperous
circumstances more splendid and by sharing and communicating adverse ones,
makes them lighter.
