De Amicitia 2: What Makes a True Friend – Virtue and Trust

[23] Cumque plurimas et maximas commoditates amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum praestat omnibus, quod bonam spem praelucet in posterum nec debilitari animos aut cadere patitur. 

And since friendship contains very many and very great advantages, then undoubtedly it surpasses all in this, that it shines a good hope into the future and does not allow spirits to be weakened or to fall. 

Verum enim amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar aliquod intuetur sui. 

For he who looks upon a true friend, looks upon, as it were, a certain likeness of himself. 

Quocirca et absentes adsunt et egentes abundant et imbecilli valent et, quod difficilius dictu est, mortui vivunt; tantus eos honos, memoria, desiderium prosequitur amicorum. 

Therefore, those who are absent are present, and those who are needy abound, and the weak are strong, and, what is more difficult to say, the dead live; so great an honor, memory, and longing accompanies them from their friends. 

Ex quo illorum beata mors videtur, horum vita laudabilis. 

From this, the death of the former seems blessed, the life of the latter praiseworthy. 

Quod si exemeris ex rerum natura benevolentiae coniunctionem, nec domus ulla nec urbs stare poterit, ne agri quidem cultus permanebit. 

But if you were to remove from the nature of things the bond of goodwill, neither any home nor any city would be able to stand, nor indeed would the cultivation of fields remain. 

Id si minus intellegitur, quanta vis amicitiae concordiaeque sit, ex dissensionibus atque ex discordiis percipi potest. 

If this is less understood, how great the power of friendship and harmony is, it can be perceived from dissensions and discords. 

Quae enim domus tam stabilis, quae tam firma civitas est, quae non odiis et discidiis funditus possit everti? 

For what house is so stable, what state so firm, that it cannot be utterly overthrown by hatreds and discords? 

Ex quo quantum boni sit in amicitia iudicari potest. 

From this, how much good there is in friendship can be judged. 

[24] Agrigentinum quidem doctum quendam virum carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura totoque mundo constarent quaeque moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam. 

Indeed, they say that a certain learned man from Agrigentum prophesied in Greek verses that things which were stable and things which were moved in the nature of things and in the whole world, these were brought together by friendship, and discord dispersed them. 

Atque hoc quidem omnes mortales et intellegunt et re probant. 

And this indeed all mortals both understand and approve by experience. 

Itaque si quando aliquod officium exstitit amici in periculis aut adeundis aut communicandis, quis est qui id non maximis efferat laudibus? 

Therefore, if ever some duty of a friend has appeared in facing or sharing dangers, who is there who does not praise it with the highest commendations? 

Qui clamores tota cavea nuper in hospitis et amici mei M. Pacuvi nova fabula! 

What shouts there were throughout the entire theater recently during the new play of my host and friend Marcus Pacuvius! 

Cum ignorante rege, uter Orestes esset, Pylades Orestem se esse diceret, ut pro illo necaretur, Orestes autem, ita ut erat, Orestem se esse perseveraret. 

When the king, unaware which of them was Orestes, Pylades declared himself to be Orestes, so that he might be killed in his stead, while Orestes, as he truly was, persisted that he was Orestes. 

Stantes plaudebant in re ficta; quid arbitramur in vera facturos fuisse? 

Standing, they applauded in a fictional matter; what do we think they would have done in a real one? 

Facile indicabat ipsa natura vim suam, cum homines, quod facere ipsi non possent, id recte fieri in altero iudicarent. 

Nature itself easily showed its power, when men judged that what they themselves could not do, was rightly done by another. 

Hactenus mihi videor de amicitia quid sentirem potuisse dicere; si quae praeterea sunt (credo autem esse multa), ab iis, si videbitur, qui ista disputant, quaeritote. 

So far I seem to myself to have been able to say what I thought about friendship; if there are any other things (and I believe there are many), ask them, if it seems good, from those who discuss such matters. 

[25] Fannius: Nos autem a te potius; quamquam etiam ab istis saepe quaesivi et audivi non invitus equidem; sed aliud quoddam filum orationis tuae. 

Fannius: But we prefer to ask you; although I have often asked from those others and indeed listened not unwillingly; but your discourse has a certain different thread. 

Scaevola: Tum magis id diceres, Fanni, si nuper in hortis Scipionis, cum est de re publica disputatum, adfuisses. 

Scaevola: You would say that all the more, Fannius, if you had been present recently in Scipio's gardens, when there was a discussion about the republic. 

Qualis tum patronus iustitiae fuit contra accuratam orationem Phili! 

What a champion of justice he was then against the elaborate speech of Philus! 

Fannius: Facile id quidem fuit iustitiam iustissimo viro defendere. 

Fannius: That indeed was easy, to defend justice for a most just man. 

Scaevola: Quid? amicitiam nonne facile ei qui ob eam summa fide, constantia iustitiaque servatam maximam gloriam ceperit? 

Scaevola: What? Is it not easy to defend friendship for him who, because it was preserved with the utmost fidelity, constancy, and justice, gained the greatest glory? 

[26] Laelius: Vim hoc quidem est adferre. 

Laelius: This indeed is to use force. 

Quid enim refert qua me ratione cogatis? 

For what does it matter by what reasoning you compel me? 

Cogitis certe. 

You certainly compel me. 

Studiis enim generorum, praesertim in re bona, cum difficile est, tum ne aequum quidem obsistere. 

For it is difficult, and not even fair, to resist the earnest desires of sons-in-law, especially in a good cause. 

Saepissime igitur mihi de amicitia cogitanti maxime illud considerandum videri solet, utrum propter imbecillitatem atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis recipiendisque meritis quod quisque minus per se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio vicissimque redderet, an esset hoc quidem proprium amicitiae, sed antiquior et pulchrior et magis a natura ipsa profecta alia causa. 

Therefore, very often, when I think about friendship, it usually seems to me that this point especially must be considered: whether friendship was desired on account of weakness and need, so that by giving and receiving favors, what each person could do less by himself, he might receive from another and in turn give back, or whether this indeed was characteristic of friendship, but another cause, more ancient and beautiful and proceeding more from nature itself. 

Amor enim, ex quo amicitia nominata est, princeps est ad benevolentiam coniungendam. 

For love, from which friendship is named, is the chief means for joining goodwill. 

Nam utilitates quidem etiam ab iis percipiuntur saepe qui simulatione amicitiae coluntur et observantur temporis causa, in amicitia autem nihil fictum est, nihil simulatum et, quidquid est, id est verum et voluntarium. 

For advantages indeed are often perceived even from those who are cultivated and observed under the pretense of friendship for temporary reasons, but in friendship nothing is feigned, nothing simulated, and whatever it is, it is true and voluntary. 

[27] Quapropter a natura mihi videtur potius quam ab indigentia orta amicitia, applicatione magis animi cum quodam sensu amandi quam cogitatione quantum illa res utilitatis esset habitura. 

Therefore, friendship seems to me to have arisen from nature rather than from need, more from an inclination of the soul with a certain sense of loving than from a calculation of how much utility that thing would have. 

Quod quidem quale sit, etiam in bestiis quibusdam animadverti potest, quae ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam tempus et ab eis ita amantur ut facile earum sensus appareat. 

What kind of thing this is, can indeed be observed even in certain animals, which so love their offspring for a certain time and are so loved by them that their feelings easily appear. 

Quod in homine multo est evidentius, primum ex ea caritate quae est inter natos et parentes, quae dirimi nisi detestabili scelere non potest; deinde cum similis sensus exstitit amoris, si aliquem nacti sumus cuius cum moribus et natura congruamus, quod in eo quasi lumen aliquod probitatis et virtutis perspicere videamur. 

This is much more evident in man, first from that affection which exists between children and parents, which cannot be broken except by detestable crime; then when a similar feeling of love has arisen, if we have found someone with whose character and nature we agree, because we seem to perceive in him, as it were, some light of integrity and virtue. 

[28] Nihil est enim virtute amabilius, nihil quod magis adliciat ad diligendum, quippe cum propter virtutem et probitatem etiam eos, quos numquam vidimus, quodam modo diligamus. 

For nothing is more lovable than virtue, nothing that more attracts one to love, since indeed on account of virtue and integrity we in a certain way love even those whom we have never seen. 

Quis est qui C. Fabrici, M'. Curi non cum caritate aliqua benevola memoriam usurpet, quos numquam viderit? 

Who is there who does not cherish the memory of Gaius Fabricius, Manius Curius, with some benevolent affection, though he has never seen them? 

Quis autem est, qui Tarquinium Superbum, qui Sp. Cassium, Sp. Maelium non oderit? 

Who, however, is there who does not hate Tarquinius Superbus, or Spurius Cassius, Spurius Maelius? 

Cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum, Pyrrho et Hannibale; ab altero propter probitatem eius non nimis alienos animos habemus, alterum propter crudelitatem semper haec civitas oderit. 

With two leaders, Pyrrhus and Hannibal, the struggle for empire in Italy was contested; from the one, on account of his integrity, we do not feel too much hostility, but the other, on account of his cruelty, this state will always hate. 

[29] Quod si tanta vis probitatis est ut eam vel in iis quos numquam vidimus, vel, quod maius est, in hoste etiam diligamus, quid mirum est, si animi hominum moveantur, cum eorum, quibuscum usu coniuncti esse possunt, virtutem et bonitatem perspicere videantur? 

But if the power of integrity is so great that we love it even in those whom we have never seen, or, what is greater, even in an enemy, what wonder is it if the minds of men are moved, when they perceive the virtue and goodness of those with whom they can be intimately associated? 

Quamquam confirmatur amor et beneficio accepto et studio perspecto et consuetudine adiuncta, quibus rebus ad illum primum motum animi et amoris adhibitis admirabilis quaedam exardescit benevolentiae magnitudo. 

However, love is strengthened both by a kindness received, and by an earnest endeavor perceived, and by habit joined, by which things, applied to that first impulse of the mind and love, a certain admirable greatness of benevolence is kindled. 

Quam si qui putant ab imbecillitate proficisci, ut sit per quem adsequatur quod quisque desideret, humilem sane relinquunt et minime generosum, ut ita dicam, ortum amicitiae, quam ex inopia atque indigentia natam volunt. 

If anyone thinks that it proceeds from weakness, so that there may be someone through whom each may obtain what he desires, they indeed leave a humble and by no means noble, so to speak, origin of friendship, which they wish to have been born from want and need. 

Quod si ita esset, ut quisque minimum esse in se arbitraretur, ita ad amicitiam esset aptissimus; quod longe secus est. 

But if it were so, that whoever thought there was least in himself, would thus be most suited for friendship; which is far from the truth. 

[30] Ut enim quisque sibi plurimum confidit et ut quisque maxime virtute et sapientia sic munitus est, ut nullo egeat suaque omnia in se ipso posita iudicet, ita in amicitiis expetendis colendisque maxime excellit. 

For as each person trusts himself most greatly, and as each is most fortified by virtue and wisdom so that he needs nothing and judges all his possessions to be placed within himself, so does he most excel in seeking and cultivating friendships. 

Quid enim? 

For what then? 

Africanus indigens mei? 

Was Africanus in need of me? 

Minime hercule! 

By Hercules, not at all! 

ac ne ego quidem illius; sed ego admiratione quadam virtutis eius, ille vicissim opinione fortasse non nulla, quam de meis moribus habebat, me dilexit; auxit benevolentiam consuetudo. 

nor indeed I of him; but I, by a certain admiration for his virtue, and he in turn, perhaps by some opinion he had of my character, loved me; habit increased our goodwill. 

Sed quamquam utilitates multae et magnae consecutae sunt, non sunt tamen ab earum spe causae diligendi profectae. 

But although many and great advantages have followed, the reasons for loving did not, however, proceed from the hope of these. 

[31] Ut enim benefici liberalesque sumus, non ut exigamus gratiam (neque enim beneficium faeneramur sed natura propensi ad liberalitatem sumus), sic amicitiam non spe mercedis adducti sed quod omnis eius fructus in ipso amore inest, expetendam putamus. 

For just as we are benevolent and generous, not that we may exact gratitude (for we do not lend a favor at interest, but are inclined by nature to generosity), so we think friendship is to be sought, not induced by hope of reward, but because all its fruit lies in love itself. 

[32] Ab his qui pecudum ritu ad voluptatem omnia referunt longe dissentiunt, nec mirum; nihil enim altum, nihil magnificum ac divinum suspicere possunt qui suas omnes cogitationes abiecerunt in rem tam humilem tamque contemptam. 

From those who refer all things to pleasure in the manner of beasts, they differ widely, and no wonder; for they can suspect nothing high, nothing magnificent and divine, who have cast down all their thoughts into a matter so humble and contemptible. 

Quam ob rem hos quidem ab hoc sermone removeamus, ipsi autem intellegamus natura gigni sensum diligendi et benevolentiae caritatem facta significatione probitatis. 

Therefore, let us remove these men from this discussion, but let us ourselves understand that the feeling of loving and the affection of goodwill are born from nature, when integrity is made manifest. 

Quam qui adpetiverunt, applicant se et propius admovent ut et usu eius, quem diligere coeperunt, fruantur et moribus sintque pares in amore et aequales propensioresque ad bene merendum quam ad reposcendum, atque haec inter eos sit honesta certatio. 

Those who have sought this, attach themselves and draw nearer, so that they may enjoy both the companionship of him whom they have begun to love, and his character, and that they may be equal in love and impartial, and more inclined to deserving well than to demanding back, and that this may be an honorable rivalry between them. 

Sic et utilitates ex amicitia maximae capientur et erit eius ortus a natura quam ab imbecillitate gravior et verior. 

Thus both the greatest advantages will be gained from friendship, and its origin will be weightier and truer from nature than from weakness. 

Nam si utilitas amicitias conglutinaret, eadem commutata dissolveret; sed quia natura mutari non potest, idcirco verae amicitiae sempiternae sunt. 

For if utility glued friendships together, the same utility, when changed, would dissolve them; but because nature cannot be changed, therefore true friendships are eternal. 

Ortum quidem amicitiae videtis, nisi quid ad haec forte vultis. 

Indeed, you see the origin of friendship, unless perhaps you wish anything more on these points. 

Fannius: Tu vero perge, Laeli; pro hoc enim, qui minor est natu, meo iure respondeo. 

Fannius: You, Laelius, indeed proceed; for him, who is younger in age, I answer by my right. 

[33] Scaevola: Recte tu quidem. 

Scaevola: You speak rightly indeed. 

Quam ob rem audiamus. 

Therefore, let us listen. 

Laelius: Audite vero, optimi viri, ea quae saepissime inter me et Scipionem de amicitia disserebantur. 

Laelius: Indeed, listen, excellent men, to those things which were very often discussed between me and Scipio concerning friendship. 

Quamquam ille quidem nihil difficilius esse dicebat, quam amicitiam usque ad extremum vitae diem permanere. 

Although he indeed used to say that nothing was more difficult than for friendship to endure even to the last day of life. 

Nam vel ut non idem expediret, incidere saepe, vel ut de re publica non idem sentiretur; mutari etiam mores hominum saepe dicebat, alias adversis rebus, alias aetate ingravescente. 

For he said it often happened either that the same thing was not advantageous, or that the same opinion was not held concerning the republic; he also often said that men's characters change, sometimes due to adverse circumstances, sometimes as age increases. 

Atque earum rerum exemplum ex similitudine capiebat ineuntis aetatis, quod summi puerorum amores saepe una cum praetexta toga ponerentur. 

And he drew an example of these things from the similarity of early youth, because the greatest loves of boys were often laid aside along with the toga praetexta. 

[34] Sin autem ad adulescentiam perduxissent, dirimi tamen interdum contentione vel uxoriae condicionis vel commodi alicuius, quod idem adipisci uterque non posset. 

But if they had extended into adolescence, they were nevertheless sometimes dissolved by contention either over a marriage proposal or some advantage which neither could obtain. 

Quod si qui longius in amicitia provecti essent, tamen saepe labefactari, si in honoris contentionem incidissent; pestem enim nullam maiorem esse amicitiis quam in plerisque pecuniae cupiditatem, in optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriae; ex quo inimicitias maximas saepe inter amicissimos exstitisse. 

But if some had advanced further in friendship, they were nevertheless often undermined if they had fallen into a rivalry for honor; for he said there was no greater plague to friendships than, in most cases, the desire for money, and in the best men, the struggle for honor and glory; from which the greatest enmities often arose among the closest friends. 

[35] Magna etiam discidia et plerumque iusta nasci, cum aliquid ab amicis quod rectum non esset postularetur, ut aut libidinis ministri aut adiutores essent ad iniuriam; quod qui recusarent, quamvis honeste id facerent, ius tamen amicitiae deserere arguerentur ab iis quibus obsequi nollent. 

He also said that great and usually just disagreements arise when something that was not right was demanded from friends, such that they should be either ministers to lust or helpers in injustice; and that those who refused this, however honorably they acted, would nevertheless be accused of abandoning the right of friendship by those whom they were unwilling to obey. 

Illos autem qui quidvis ab amico auderent postulare, postulatione ipsa profiteri omnia se amici causa esse facturos. 

Moreover, those who dared to demand anything from a friend, by the very demand, professed that they would do everything for the sake of a friend. 

Eorum querella inveterata non modo familiaritates exstingui solere sed odia etiam gigni sempiterna. 

When their complaint became ingrained, not only were friendships accustomed to be extinguished, but eternal hatreds were also generated. 

Haec ita multa quasi fata impendere amicitiis ut omnia subterfugere non modo sapientiae sed etiam felicitatis diceret sibi videri. 

He said that so many fates, as it were, threatened friendships, that to escape them all seemed to him to belong not only to wisdom but also to good fortune. 

[36] Quam ob rem id primum videamus, si placet, quatenus amor in amicitia progredi debeat. 

Therefore, let us first see, if you please, how far love ought to advance in friendship. 

Numne, si Coriolanus habuit amicos, ferre contra patriam arma illi cum Coriolano debuerunt? 

Surely, if Coriolanus had friends, ought they to have borne arms against their country with Coriolanus? 

Num Vecellinum amici regnum adpetentem, num Maelium debuerunt iuvare? 

Surely, ought friends to have helped Vecellinus, striving for kingship, or Maelius? 

[37] Ti. quidem Gracchum rem publicam vexantem a Q. Tuberone aequalibusque amicis derelictum videbamus. 

Indeed, we saw Tiberius Gracchus, disturbing the republic, abandoned by Quintus Tubero and his contemporary friends. 

At C. Blossius Cumanus, hospes familiae vestrae, Scaevola, cum ad me, quod aderam Laenati et Rupilio consulibus in consilio, deprecatum venisset, hanc ut sibi ignoscerem, causam adferebat, quod tanti Ti. Gracchum fecisset ut, quidquid ille vellet, sibi faciendum putaret. 

But Gaius Blossius Cumanus, a guest of your family, Scaevola, when he had come to me to plead, because I was present in the council of Laenas and Rupilius, he offered this as a reason why I should forgive him: because he had held Tiberius Gracchus in such high regard that whatever the latter wished, he thought he himself must do. 

Tum ego: "Etiamne, si te in Capitolium faces ferre vellet?" "Numquam" inquit "voluisset id quidem; sed si voluisset, paruissem." 

Then I said: "Even if he wished you to carry torches into the Capitol?" "He would never have wished that indeed," he said; "but if he had wished it, I would have obeyed." 

Videtis, quam nefaria vox! 

You see, what an impious utterance! 

Et hercule ita fecit vel plus etiam quam dixit; non enim paruit ille Ti. Gracchi temeritati sed praefuit, nec se comitem illius furoris, sed ducem praebuit. 

And by Hercules, he acted even more than he spoke; for he did not obey Tiberius Gracchus's rashness, but presided over it, and presented himself not as a companion of that madness, but as a leader. 

Itaque hac amentia quaestione nova perterritus in Asiam profugit, ad hostes se contulit, poenas rei publicae graves iustasque persolvit. 

Therefore, terrified by this madness and a new investigation, he fled to Asia, betook himself to the enemy, and paid heavy and just penalties to the republic. 

Nulla est igitur excusatio peccati, si amici causa peccaveris; nam cum conciliatrix amicitiae virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est amicitiam manere, si a virtute defeceris. 

There is, therefore, no excuse for wrongdoing, if you have done wrong for a friend's sake; for since the opinion of virtue has been the uniter of friendship, it is difficult for friendship to remain if you have abandoned virtue. 

[38] Quod si rectum statuerimus vel concedere amicis, quidquid velint, vel impetrare ab iis, quidquid velimus, perfecta quidem sapientia si simus, nihil habeat res vitii; sed loquimur de iis amicis qui ante oculos sunt, quos vidimus aut de quibus memoriam accepimus, quos novit vita communis. 

But if we resolve that it is right either to concede to friends whatever they wish, or to obtain from them whatever we wish, then indeed, if we are of perfect wisdom, the matter would have no fault; but we are speaking of those friends who are before our eyes, whom we have seen or of whom we have received memory, whom common life knows. 

Ex hoc numero nobis exempla sumenda sunt, et eorum quidem maxime qui ad sapientiam proxime accedunt. 

From this number we must take examples, and indeed especially from those who approach closest to wisdom. 

[39] Videmus Papum Aemilium Luscino familiarem fuisse (sic a patribus accepimus), bis una consules, collegas in censura; tum et cum iis et inter se coniunctissimos fuisse M'. Curium, Ti. Coruncanium memoriae proditum est. 

We see that Papus Aemilius was intimate with Luscinus (so we have received from our fathers), twice consuls together, colleagues in the censorship; then it is handed down by memory that Manius Curius, Tiberius Coruncanius, were most closely united both with them and among themselves. 

Igitur ne suspicari quidem possumus quemquam horum ab amico quippiam contendisse, quod contra fidem, contra ius iurandum, contra rem publicam esset. 

Therefore, we cannot even suspect that any of these men contended with a friend for anything that would be against faith, against an oath, against the republic. 

Nam hoc quidem in talibus viris quid attinet dicere, si contendisset, impetraturum non fuisse? 

For what point is there in saying this concerning such men, that if he had contended, he would not have obtained it? 

Cum illi sanctissimi viri fuerint, aeque autem nefas sit tale aliquid et facere rogatum et rogare. 

Since those men were most sacred, and moreover it is equally impious both to do such a thing when asked and to ask for it. 

At vero Ti. Gracchum sequebantur C. Carbo, C. Cato, et minime tum quidem C. frater, nunc idem acerrimus. 

But indeed, Gaius Carbo, Gaius Cato, and, least of all then, Gaius's brother, now the same fiercest man, followed Tiberius Gracchus. 

[40] Haec igitur lex in amicitia sanciatur, ut neque rogemus res turpes nec faciamus rogati. 

Therefore let this law be sanctioned in friendship: that we neither ask for shameful things nor do them when asked. 

Turpis enim excusatio est et minime accipienda cum in ceteris peccatis, tum si quis contra rem publicam se amici causa fecisse fateatur. 

For it is a disgraceful excuse and least acceptable, both in other offenses, and especially if anyone confesses that he has acted against the republic for a friend's sake. 

Etenim eo loco, Fanni et Scaevola, locati sumus ut nos longe prospicere oporteat futuros casus rei publicae. 

Indeed, Fannius and Scaevola, we are placed in such a position that we ought to foresee from afar the future misfortunes of the republic. 

Deflexit iam aliquantum de spatio curriculoque consuetudo maiorum. 

The custom of our ancestors has already deviated somewhat from its course and track. 

[41] Ti. Gracchus regnum occupare conatus est, vel regnavit is quidem paucos menses. 

Tiberius Gracchus attempted to seize power, or indeed he reigned for a few months. 

Num quid simile populus Romanus audierat aut viderat? 

Had the Roman people ever heard or seen anything similar? 

Hunc etiam post mortem secuti amici et propinqui quid in P. Scipione effecerint, sine lacrimis non queo dicere. 

What his friends and relatives, following him even after his death, accomplished against Publius Scipio, I cannot say without tears. 

Nam Carbonem, quocumque modo potuimus, propter recentem poenam Ti. Gracchi sustinuimus; de C. Gracchi autem tribunatu quid expectem, non libet augurari. 

For we endured Carbo, as best we could, on account of the recent punishment of Tiberius Gracchus; but what I should expect concerning Gaius Gracchus's tribunate, I do not care to prophesy. 

Serpit deinde res; quae proclivis ad perniciem, cum semel coepit, labitur. 

Then the matter creeps on; which, prone to destruction, once it has begun, slides onward. 

Videtis in tabella iam ante quanta sit facta labes, primo Gabinia lege, biennio autem post Cassia. 

You now see in the list how great a corruption has already occurred, first by the Gabinian law, and two years later by the Cassian. 

Videre iam videor populum a senatu disiunctum, multitudinis arbitrio res maximas agi. 

I now seem to see the people separated from the senate, and the most important matters being conducted by the will of the multitude. 

Plures enim discent quem ad modum haec fiant, quam quem ad modum iis resistatur. 

For more will learn how these things are done, than how they are resisted. 

[42] Quorsum haec? 

To what end these remarks? 

Quia sine sociis nemo quicquam tale conatur. 

Because no one attempts anything of the sort without allies. 

Praecipiendum est igitur bonis ut, si in eius modi amicitias ignari casu aliquo inciderint, ne existiment ita se alligatos ut ab amicis in magna aliqua re publica peccantibus non discedant; improbis autem poena statuenda est, nec vero minor iis qui secuti erunt alterum, quam iis qui ipsi fuerint impietatis duces. 

It must be taught therefore to good men that, if they have ignorantly fallen into such friendships by some chance, they should not think themselves so bound as not to depart from friends who are wronging the state in some great matter; but for wicked men, punishment must be established, and indeed no less for those who followed another, than for those who were themselves the leaders of impiety. 

Quis clarior in Graecia Themistocle, quis potentior? 

Who was more famous in Greece than Themistocles, who more powerful? 

Qui cum imperator bello Persico servitute Graeciam liberavisset propterque invidiam in exsilium expulsus esset, ingratae patriae iniuriam non tulit, quam ferre debuit, fecit idem, quod xx annis ante apud nos fecerat Coriolanus. 

He, who, when as general in the Persian war he had freed Greece from slavery and had been driven into exile on account of envy, did not bear the injustice of his ungrateful country, which he ought to have borne, but did the same thing that Coriolanus had done among us twenty years before. 

His adiutor contra patriam inventus est nemo; itaque mortem sibi uterque conscivit. 

No helper against their country was found for them; and so each committed suicide. 

[43] Quare talis improborum consensio non modo excusatione amicitiae tegenda non est sed potius supplicio omni vindicanda est, ut ne quis concessum putet amicum vel bellum patriae inferentem sequi; quod quidem, ut res ire coepit, haud scio an aliquando futurum sit. 

Therefore, such a conspiracy of wicked men must not only not be concealed by the excuse of friendship, but rather must be punished by every penalty, so that no one may think it permissible to follow a friend even when he wages war on his country; which indeed, as things have begun to go, I hardly know whether it will happen someday. 

Mihi autem non minori curae est, qualis res publica post mortem meam futura, quam qualis hodie sit. 

Moreover, it is no less a concern to me what the republic will be like after my death than what it is like today. 

[44] Haec igitur prima lex amicitiae sanciatur, ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causa honesta faciamus, ne exspectemus quidem, dum rogemur; studium semper adsit, cunctatio absit; consilium vero dare audeamus libere. 

Therefore let this first law of friendship be sanctioned: that from friends we seek honorable things, for the sake of friends we do honorable things, and let us not even wait until we are asked; let eagerness always be present, hesitation absent; and let us dare to give counsel freely. 

Plurimum in amicitia amicorum bene suadentium valeat auctoritas, eaque et adhibeatur ad monendum non modo aperte sed etiam acriter, si res postulabit, et adhibitae pareatur. 

In friendship, the authority of friends who advise well should be most powerful, and it should be used for admonishing not only openly but also sharply, if the situation demands it, and when used, it should be obeyed. 

[45] Nam quibusdam, quos audio sapientes habitos in Graecia, placuisse opinor mirabilia quaedam (sed nihil est quod illi non persequantur argutiis): partim fugiendas esse nimias amicitias, ne necesse sit unum sollicitum esse pro pluribus; satis superque esse sibi suarum cuique rerum, alienis nimis implicari molestum esse; commodissimum esse quam laxissimas habenas habere amicitiae, quas vel adducas, cum velis, vel remittas; caput enim esse ad beate vivendum securitatem, qua frui non possit animus, si tamquam parturiat unus pro pluribus. 

For some, whom I hear were considered wise in Greece, certain marvelous things, I believe, have been pleasing (but there is nothing which they do not pursue with subtle arguments): partly that excessive friendships should be avoided, lest one be necessarily anxious for too many; that each person has enough and more of his own affairs, and to be too much entangled in others' affairs is troublesome; that it is most convenient to hold the reins of friendship as loosely as possible, which you can either tighten when you wish, or loosen; for the chief thing for living blessedly is security, which the mind cannot enjoy if it, as it were, labors for many. 

[46] Alios autem dicere aiunt multo etiam inhumanus (quem locum breviter paulo ante perstrinxi) praesidii adiumentique causa, non benevolentiae neque caritatis, amicitias esse expetendas; itaque, ut quisque minimum firmitatis haberet minimumque virium, ita amicitias appetere maxime; ex eo fieri ut mulierculae magis amicitiarum praesidia quaerant quam viri et inopes quam opulenti et calamitosi quam ii qui putentur beati. 

Others, moreover, they say, assert something much more inhuman (a topic which I briefly touched upon a little earlier), that friendships are to be sought for the sake of protection and aid, not for goodwill or affection; and so, that the less firmness and strength each person had, the more eagerly they sought friendships; from which it happens that women seek the protections of friendships more than men, and the needy more than the wealthy, and the unfortunate more than those who are considered blessed.