De Amicitia 3: Friendship and Public Life – The Limits of Loyalty

[47] O praeclaram sapientiam! 

Oh, splendid wisdom! 

Solem enim e mundo tollere videntur, qui amicitiam e vita tollunt, qua nihil a dis immortalibus melius habemus, nihil iucundius. 

For they seem to remove the sun from the world, who remove friendship from life, than which we have nothing better, nothing more pleasant, from the immortal gods. 

Quae est enim ista securitas? 

For what is that security? 

Specie quidem blanda sed reapse multis locis repudianda. 

Plausible in appearance indeed, but in reality to be rejected in many places. 

Neque enim est consentaneum ullam honestam rem actionemve, ne sollicitus sis, aut non suscipere aut susceptam deponere. 

Nor indeed is it reasonable to not undertake any honorable deed or action, or to abandon it once undertaken, lest you be anxious. 

Quod si curam fugimus, virtus fugienda est, quae necesse est cum aliqua cura res sibi contrarias aspernetur atque oderit, ut bonitas malitiam, temperantia libidinem, ignaviam fortitudo; itaque videas rebus iniustis iustos maxime dolere, imbellibus fortes, flagitiosis modestos. 

But if we flee care, virtue must be fled, which must, with some care, scorn and hate things contrary to itself, as goodness hates malice, temperance hates lust, courage hates cowardice; and so you may see just men grieve most over unjust deeds, brave men over unmanly ones, modest men over disgraceful ones. 

Ergo hoc proprium est animi bene constituti, et laetari bonis rebus et dolere contrariis. 

Therefore this is characteristic of a well-ordered mind, both to rejoice in good things and to grieve in contrary ones. 

[48] Quam ob rem si cadit in sapientem animi dolor, qui profecto cadit, nisi ex eius animo exstirpatam humanitatem arbitramur, quae causa est cur amicitiam funditus tollamus e vita, ne aliquas propter eam suscipiamus molestias? 

Therefore, if sorrow falls upon a wise man's mind, which it certainly does, unless we think humanity has been uprooted from his soul, what reason is there why we should utterly remove friendship from life, lest we undertake some troubles on its account? 

Quid enim interest motu animi sublato non dico inter pecudem et hominem, sed inter hominem et truncum aut saxum aut quidvis generis eiusdem? 

For what difference is there, with emotion removed, I do not say between a beast and a man, but between a man and a log or a rock or anything of the same kind? 

Neque enim sunt isti audiendi qui virtutem duram et quasi ferream esse quandam volunt; quae quidem est cum multis in rebus, tum in amicitia tenera atque tractabilis, ut et bonis amici quasi diffundatur et incommodis contrahatur. 

Nor indeed are those to be listened to who wish virtue to be harsh and, as it were, of iron; which indeed, while in many things, yet in friendship is tender and flexible, so that it is, as it were, expanded by a friend's good fortune and contracted by his misfortunes. 

Quam ob rem angor iste, qui pro amico saepe capiendus est, non tantum valet ut tollat e vita amicitiam, non plus quam ut virtutes, quia non nullas curas et molestias adferunt, repudientur. 

Therefore that distress, which must often be endured for a friend, is not strong enough to remove friendship from life, no more than that virtues, because they bring some cares and troubles, should be rejected. 

Cum autem contrahat amicitiam, ut supra dixi, si qua significatio virtutis eluceat, ad quam se similis animus applicet et adiungat, id cum contigit, amor exoriatur necesse est. 

But when friendship is contracted, as I said above, if some indication of virtue shines forth, to which a similar soul attaches and joins itself, when that happens, love must necessarily arise. 

[49] Quid enim tam absurdum quam delectari multis inanimis rebus, ut honore, ut gloria, ut aedificio, ut vestitu cultuque corporis, animante virtute praedito, eo qui vel amare vel, ut ita dicam, redamare possit, non admodum delectari? 

For what is so absurd as to be delighted by many inanimate things, such as honor, glory, a building, clothing and bodily adornment, yet not to be greatly delighted by a living being endowed with virtue, one who can both love and, so to speak, love in return? 

Nihil est enim remuneratione benevolentiae, nihil vicissitudine studiorum officiorumque iucundius. 

For nothing is more pleasant than the return of goodwill, nothing more delightful than the exchange of earnest desires and services. 

[50] Quid, si illud etiam addimus, quod recte addi potest, nihil esse quod ad se rem ullam tam alliciat et attrahat quam ad amicitiam similitudo? 

What, if we also add this, which can rightly be added, that there is nothing which so attracts and draws any thing to itself as likeness does to friendship? 

Concedetur profecto verum esse, ut bonos boni diligant adsciscantque sibi quasi propinquitate coniunctos atque natura. 

It will certainly be conceded to be true, that good men love good men and associate them with themselves as if joined by kinship and nature. 

Nihil est enim appetentius similium sui nec rapacius quam natura. 

For nothing is more desirous of its like nor more grasping than nature. 

Quam ob rem hoc quidem, Fanni et Scaevola, constet, ut opinor, bonis inter bonos quasi necessariam benevolentiam, qui est amicitiae fons a natura constitutus. 

Therefore, let this indeed be established, Fannius and Scaevola, as I think, that among good men there is, as it were, a necessary goodwill, which is the fount of friendship established by nature. 

Sed eadem bonitas etiam ad multitudinem pertinet. 

But the same goodness also pertains to the multitude. 

Non enim est inhumana virtus neque immunis neque superba, quae etiam populos universos tueri iisque optime consulere soleat; quod non faceret profecto, si a caritate vulgi abhorreret. 

For virtue is not inhuman, nor unrewarded, nor proud, which is accustomed even to protect whole peoples and to care for them best; which it certainly would not do, if it recoiled from the affection of the common people. 

[51] Atque etiam mihi quidem videntur, qui utilitatum causa fingunt amicitias, amabilissimum nodum amicitiae tollere. 

And indeed it seems to me that those who feign friendships for the sake of utility destroy the most lovable bond of friendship. 

Non enim tam utilitas parta per amicum quam amici amor ipse delectat, tumque illud fit, quod ab amico est profectum, iucundum, si cum studio est profectum; tantumque abest, ut amicitiae propter indigentiam colantur, ut ii qui opibus et copiis maximeque virtute, in qua plurimum est praesidii, minime alterius indigeant, liberalissimi sint et beneficentissimi. 

For it is not so much the utility gained through a friend as the love of the friend itself that delights, and then that which has proceeded from a friend becomes pleasant, if it has proceeded with zeal; and so far is it from the truth that friendships are cultivated on account of need, that those who least need another, being most abundant in wealth and resources and especially in virtue, in which there is very great protection, are most liberal and most beneficent. 

Atque haud sciam an ne opus sit quidem nihil umquam omnino deesse amicis. 

And I hardly know whether it is even necessary for friends never to lack anything at all. 

Ubi enim studia nostra viguissent, si numquam consilio, numquam opera nostra nec domi nec militiae Scipio eguisset? 

For where would our zeal have flourished, if Scipio had never needed our counsel, never our help, either at home or in war? 

Non igitur utilitatem amicitia, sed utilitas amicitiam secuta est. 

Therefore, friendship did not follow utility, but utility followed friendship. 

[52] Non ergo erunt homines deliciis diffluentes audiendi, si quando de amicitia, quam nec usu nec ratione habent cognitam, disputabunt. 

Therefore, men overflowing with luxuries are not to be listened to, if ever they discuss friendship, which they have known neither by experience nor by reason. 

Nam quis est, pro deorum fidem atque hominum! qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam nec ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus copiis atque in omnium rerum abundantia vivere? 

For who is there, by the faith of gods and men! who would wish, neither to love anyone nor to be loved by anyone himself, to abound in all resources and live in the abundance of all things? 

Haec enim est tyrannorum vita nimirum, in qua nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis benevolentiae potest esse fiducia, omnia semper suspecta atque sollicita, nullus locus amicitiae. 

For this indeed is the life of tyrants, in which there is no trust, no affection, no stable confidence of goodwill, all things are always suspected and anxious, no place for friendship. 

[53] Quis enim aut eum diligat quem metuat, aut eum a quo se metui putet? 

For who would either love him whom he fears, or him by whom he thinks himself feared? 

Coluntur tamen simulatione dumtaxat ad tempus. 

They are cultivated, however, by pretense only for a time. 

Quod si forte, ut fit plerumque, ceciderunt, tum intellegitur quam fuerint inopes amicorum. 

But if by chance, as usually happens, they have fallen, then it is understood how destitute they were of friends. 

Quod Tarquinium dixisse ferunt, tum exsulantem se intellexisse quos fidos amicos habuisset, quos infidos, cum iam neutris gratiam referre posset. 

Tarquinius is said to have said that then, while in exile, he understood whom he had had as faithful friends, and whom as unfaithful, when he could no longer show gratitude to either. 

[54] Quamquam miror, illa superbia et importunitate si quemquam amicum habere potuit. 

Although I wonder if, with that pride and ill-nature, he could have had any friend. 

Atque ut huius, quem dixi, mores veros amicos parare non potuerunt, sic multorum opes praepotentium excludunt amicitias fideles. 

And just as the character of this man, whom I mentioned, could not acquire true friends, so the wealth of many very powerful men excludes faithful friendships. 

Non enim solum ipsa Fortuna caeca est sed eos etiam plerumque efficit caecos quos complexa est; itaque efferuntur fere fastidio et contumacia nec quicquam insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest. 

For not only is Fortune herself blind, but she also generally makes blind those whom she has embraced; and so they are almost always carried away by disdain and arrogance, and nothing more intolerable can be created than a foolish man who is fortunate. 

Atque hoc quidem videre licet, eos qui antea commodis fuerint moribus, imperio, potestate, prosperis rebus immutari, sperni ab iis veteres amicitias, indulgeri novis. 

And indeed it is possible to see this, that those who were formerly of agreeable manners, by power, authority, and prosperity are changed, and old friendships are scorned by them, new ones indulged. 

[55] Quid autem stultius quam, cum plurimum copiis, facultatibus, opibus possint, cetera parare, quae parantur pecunia, equos, famulos, vestem egregiam, vasa pretiosa, amicos non parare, optimam et pulcherrimam vitae, ut ita dicam, supellectilem? 

What then is more foolish than, when they are most powerful in resources, abilities, and wealth, to acquire other things which are acquired with money—horses, servants, splendid clothing, valuable vessels—but not to acquire friends, the best and most beautiful furniture, so to speak, of life? 

Etenim cetera cum parant, cui parent, nesciunt, nec cuius causa laborent (eius enim est istorum quidque, qui vicit viribus), amicitiarum sua cuique permanet stabilis et certa possessio; ut, etiamsi illa maneant, quae sunt quasi dona Fortunae, tamen vita inculta et deserta ab amicis non possit esse iucunda. 

For when they acquire other things, they do not know for whom they acquire them, nor for whose sake they labor (for each of those things belongs to him who has conquered by force), but of friendships, his own stable and certain possession remains for each; so that, even if those things remain which are, as it were, gifts of Fortune, nevertheless life, uncultivated and deserted by friends, cannot be pleasant. 

Sed haec hactenus. 

But enough of these matters. 

[56] Constituendi autem sunt qui sint in amicitia fines et quasi termini diligendi. 

Moreover, the limits and, as it were, boundaries of loving in friendship must be established. 

De quibus tres video sententias ferri, quarum nullam probo, unam, ut eodem modo erga amicum adfecti simus, quo erga nosmet ipsos, alteram, ut nostra in amicos benevolentia illorum erga nos benevolentiae pariter aequaliterque respondeat, tertiam, ut, quanti quisque se ipse facit, tanti fiat ab amicis. 

Concerning these, I see three opinions being put forth, none of which I approve: one, that we should be affected towards a friend in the same way as towards ourselves; the second, that our goodwill towards friends should respond equally and reciprocally to their goodwill towards us; the third, that each person should be valued by his friends as much as he values himself. 

[57] Harum trium sententiarum nulli prorsus assentior. 

I assent to absolutely none of these three opinions. 

Nec enim illa prima vera est, ut, quem ad modum in se quisque sit, sic in amicum sit animatus. 

For neither is that first one true, that as each person is disposed towards himself, so he should be disposed towards a friend. 

Quam multa enim, quae nostra causa numquam faceremus, facimus causa amicorum! 

For how many things, which we would never do for our own sake, do we do for the sake of friends! 

precari ab indigno, supplicare, tum acerbius in aliquem invehi insectarique vehementius, quae in nostris rebus non satis honeste, in amicorum fiunt honestissime; multaeque res sunt in quibus de suis commodis viri boni multa detrahunt detrahique patiuntur, ut iis amici potius quam ipsi fruantur. 

To beg from an unworthy person, to entreat, then to inveigh more sharply against someone and to pursue him more vehemently—which things are not sufficiently honorable in our own affairs, but are most honorable when done in a friend's; and there are many things in which good men subtract much from their own advantages and allow them to be subtracted, so that friends may enjoy them rather than themselves. 

[58] Altera sententia est, quae definit amicitiam paribus officiis ac voluntatibus. 

The second opinion is that which defines friendship by equal services and goodwills. 

Hoc quidem est nimis exigue et exiliter ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par sit ratio acceptorum et datorum. 

This indeed is to call friendship to account too narrowly and meagerly, so that the balance of things received and given is equal. 

Divitior mihi et affluentior videtur esse vera amicitia nec observare restricte, ne plus reddat quam acceperit; neque enim verendum est, ne quid excidat, aut ne quid in terram defluat, aut ne plus aequo quid in amicitiam congeratur. 

True friendship seems to me richer and more abundant, and it does not observe strictly lest it return more than it has received; nor indeed is there cause to fear that anything might fall out, or that anything might flow away into the ground, or that anything more than is fair might be heaped into friendship. 

[59] Tertius vero ille finis deterrimus, ut, quanti quisque se ipse faciat, tanti fiat ab amicis. 

But that third limit is the worst, namely, that a friend be valued by his friends as much as he values himself. 

Saepe enim in quibusdam aut animus abiectior est aut spes amplificandae fortunae fractior. 

For often in some, either the spirit is too dejected or the hope of augmenting one's fortune is too broken. 

Non est igitur amici talem esse in eum qualis ille in se est, sed potius eniti et efficere ut amici iacentem animum excitet inducatque in spem cogitationemque meliorem. 

It is not therefore the part of a friend to be towards him as he is towards himself, but rather to strive and bring it about that he arouses the drooping spirit of his friend and leads him into better hope and thought. 

Alius igitur finis verae amicitiae constituendus est, si prius, quid maxime reprehendere Scipio solitus sit, dixero. 

Therefore, another limit for true friendship must be established, if first I state what Scipio was most accustomed to criticize. 

Negabat ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse reperiri quam eius, qui dixisset ita amare oportere, ut si aliquando esset osurus; nec vero se adduci posse, ut hoc, quem ad modum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum crederet, qui sapiens habitus esset unus e septem; impuri cuiusdam aut ambitiosi aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis esse sententiam. 

He denied that any utterance more hostile to friendship could have been found than that of one who said that one ought to love in such a way as if one would someday hate; nor indeed could he be led to believe that this, as it was thought, had been said by Bias, who was held to be one of the seven wise men; but that it was the sentiment of some impure, or ambitious, or all-to-his-own-power recalling person. 

Quonam enim modo quisquam amicus esse poterit ei, cui se putabit inimicum esse posse? 

For in what way will anyone be able to be a friend to him whom he thinks he can become an enemy? 

Quin etiam necesse erit cupere et optare, ut quam saepissime peccet amicus, quo plures det sibi tamquam ansas ad reprehendendum; rursum autem recte factis commodisque amicorum necesse erit angi, dolere, invidere. 

Indeed, it will even be necessary to desire and hope that a friend errs as often as possible, so that he may give himself, as it were, more handles for reproach; and again, it will necessarily cause distress, grief, and envy at the right actions and advantages of friends. 

[60] Quare hoc quidem praeceptum, cuiuscumque est, ad tollendam amicitiam valet; illud potius praecipiendum fuit, ut eam diligentiam adhiberemus in amicitiis comparandis, ut ne quando amare inciperemus eum, quem aliquando odisse possemus. 

Therefore this precept, whoever's it is, serves to destroy friendship; rather, that precept should have been given, that we should exercise such diligence in forming friendships, that we should never begin to love one whom we could someday hate. 

Quin etiam si minus felices in diligendo fuissemus, ferendum id Scipio potius quam inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum putabat. 

Indeed, even if we had been less fortunate in choosing, Scipio thought it should be borne rather than thinking of a time for enmities. 

[61] His igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut, cum emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum, voluntatum sine ulla exceptione communitas, ut, etiamsi qua fortuna acciderit ut minus iustae amicorum voluntates adiuvandae sint, in quibus eorum aut caput agatur aut fama, declinandum de via sit, modo ne summa turpitudo sequatur; est enim quatenus amicitiae dari venia possit. 

Therefore, I think these limits should be used: that, when the characters of friends are irreproachable, then there should be among them a community of all things, counsels, and wishes without any exception, so that, even if some fortune should happen such that friends' less just wishes need to be supported, in which either their life or reputation is at stake, one should deviate from the path, provided that utter disgrace does not follow; for there is a limit to which pardon can be given to friendship. 

Nec vero neglegenda est fama nec mediocre telum ad res gerendas existimare oportet benevolentiam civium; quam blanditiis et assentando colligere turpe est; virtus, quam sequitur caritas, minime repudianda est. 

Nor indeed should reputation be neglected, nor ought one to consider the goodwill of citizens a trifling weapon for managing affairs; to gather it by flattery and assent is disgraceful; virtue, which affection follows, is by no means to be rejected. 

[62] Sed (saepe enim redeo ad Scipionem, cuius omnis sermo erat de amicitia) querebatur, quod omnibus in rebus homines diligentiores essent; capras et oves quot quisque haberet, dicere posse, amicos quot haberet, non posse dicere et in illis quidem parandis adhibere curam, in amicis eligendis neglegentis esse nec habere quasi signa quaedam et notas, quibus eos qui ad amicitias essent idonei, iudicarent. 

But (for I often return to Scipio, whose entire conversation was about friendship) he complained that in all matters men were more diligent; they could say how many goats and sheep each had, but could not say how many friends they had, and indeed they took care in acquiring the former, but were negligent in choosing friends, and did not have, as it were, certain signs and marks by which they might judge those who were suitable for friendships. 

Sunt igitur firmi et stabiles et constantes eligendi; cuius generis est magna penuria. 

Therefore, firm, stable, and constant friends are to be chosen; of which kind there is a great scarcity. 

Et iudicare difficile est sane nisi expertum; experiendum autem est in ipsa amicitia. 

And to judge is certainly difficult unless one has experienced it; but one must experience it in friendship itself. 

Ita praecurrit amicitia iudicium tollitque experiendi potestatem. 

Thus friendship outruns judgment and removes the power of experience. 

[63] Est igitur prudentis sustinere ut cursum, sic impetum benevolentiae, quo utamur quasi equis temptatis, sic amicitia ex aliqua parte periclitatis moribus amicorum. 

It is therefore characteristic of a prudent man to restrain, just as a course, so the impulse of goodwill, so that we use friendship, as we do tried horses, after having tested the characters of friends to some extent. 

Quidam saepe in parva pecunia perspiciuntur quam sint leves, quidam autem, quos parva movere non potuit, cognoscuntur in magna. 

Some are often revealed to be how fickle they are in a small sum of money, while others, whom small things could not move, are discovered in great ones. 

Sin vero erunt aliqui reperti qui pecuniam praeferre amicitiae sordidum existiment, ubi eos inveniemus, qui honores, magistratus, imperia, potestates, opes amicitiae non anteponant, ut, cum ex altera parte proposita haec sint, ex altera ius amicitiae, non multo illa malint? 

But if indeed some will be found who consider it sordid to prefer money to friendship, where shall we find those who do not prefer honors, magistracies, commands, powers, and wealth to friendship, so that, when these things are offered on one side, and the right of friendship on the other, they would not much rather choose the former? 

Imbecilla enim est natura ad contemnendam potentiam; quam etiamsi neglecta amicitia consecuti sint, obscuratum iri arbitrantur, quia non sine magna causa sit neglecta amicitia. 

For human nature is weak in despising power; and even if they have attained it by neglecting friendship, they think it will be obscured, because friendship was not neglected without a great cause. 

[64] Itaque verae amicitiae difficillime reperiuntur in iis qui in honoribus reque publica versantur; ubi enim istum invenias qui honorem amici anteponat suo? 

Therefore, true friendships are found with the greatest difficulty among those who are engaged in public office and affairs of state; for where would you find such a man who prefers a friend's honor to his own? 

Quid? haec ut omittam, quam graves, quam difficiles plerisque videntur calamitatuam societates! 

What? To omit these things, how serious, how difficult to most do associations in calamities seem! 

Ad quas non est facile inventu qui descendant. 

To which it is not easy to find those who would descend. 

Quamquam Ennius recte: Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur, tamen haec duo levitatis et infirmitatis plerosque convincunt, aut si in bonis rebus contemnunt aut in malis deserunt. 

Although Ennius rightly says: "A sure friend is discerned in an unsure situation," nevertheless these two things convict most of lightness and weakness, either if they scorn in good circumstances or desert in bad. 

Qui igitur utraque in re gravem, constantem, stabilem se in amicitia praestiterit, hunc ex maxime raro genere hominum iudicare debemus et paene divino. 

Whoever, therefore, shows himself steadfast, constant, and stable in friendship in both respects, him we ought to judge as belonging to a most rare and almost divine class of men. 

[65] Firmamentum autem stabilitatis constantiaeque eius, quam in amicitia quaerimus, fides est; nihil est enim stabile quod infidum est. 

Moreover, the foundation of that stability and constancy which we seek in friendship is faithfulness; for nothing is stable that is unfaithful. 

Simplicem praeterea et communem et consentientem, id est qui rebus isdem moveatur, eligi par est, quae omnia pertinent ad fidelitatem; neque enim fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium et tortuosum, neque vero, qui non isdem rebus movetur naturaque consentit, aut fidus aut stabilis potest esse. 

Besides, it is proper to choose someone simple, and amiable, and agreeable, that is, one who is moved by the same things, all of which pertain to faithfulness; for a complicated and crooked disposition cannot be faithful, nor indeed can one who is not moved by the same things and does not agree in nature be either faithful or stable. 

Addendum eodem est, ut ne criminibus aut inferendis delectetur aut credat oblatis, quae pertinent omnia ad eam, quam iam dudum tracto, constantiam. 

To the same point must be added, that one should neither delight in bringing charges nor believe those brought, all of which pertain to that constancy which I have long been discussing. 

Ita fit verum illud, quod initio dixi, amicitiam nisi inter bonos esse non posse. 

Thus that saying which I mentioned at the beginning becomes true, that friendship cannot exist except among good men. 

Est enim boni viri, quem eundem sapientem licet dicere, haec duo tenere in amicitia: primum ne quid fictum sit neve simulatum; aperte enim vel odisse magis ingenui est quam fronte occultare sententiam; deinde non solum ab aliquo allatas criminationes repellere, sed ne ipsum quidem esse suspiciosum, semper aliquid existimantem ab amico esse violatum. 

For it is the part of a good man, whom one may also call wise, to maintain these two things in friendship: first, that nothing be feigned or simulated; for it is more the mark of an ingenuous person even to hate openly than to conceal one's true feelings with one's countenance; secondly, not only to repel accusations brought by someone, but not even to be suspicious oneself, always imagining something violated by a friend. 

[66] Accedat huc suavitas quaedam oportet sermonum atque morum, haudquaquam mediocre condimentum amicitiae. 

To this there must be added a certain pleasantness of conversation and manners, by no means a mediocre seasoning of friendship. 

Tristitia autem et in omni re severitas habet illa quidem gravitatem, sed amicitia remissior esse debet et liberior et dulcior et ad omnem comitatem facilitatemque proclivior. 

But sadness and severity in every matter do indeed have weight, yet friendship ought to be more relaxed and freer and sweeter and more inclined to every kind of courtesy and ease. 

[67] Exsistit autem hoc loco quaedam quaestio subdifficilis, num quando amici novi, digni amicitia, veteribus sint anteponendi, ut equis vetulis teneros anteponere solemus. 

At this point, a somewhat difficult question arises: whether new friends, worthy of friendship, should ever be preferred to old ones, as we are accustomed to prefer young horses to old nags. 

Indigna homine dubitatio! 

A doubt unworthy of a man! 

[61] Non enim debent esse amicitiarum sicut aliarum rerum satietates; veterrima quaeque, ut ea vina, quae vetustatem ferunt, esse debet suavissima; verumque illud est, quod dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiae munus expletum sit. 

For there ought not to be surfeits of friendships as there are of other things; every oldest thing, like those wines which bear age, ought to be the sweetest; and that saying is true, that many measures of salt must be eaten together, for the bond of friendship to be fulfilled. 

[68] Novitates autem si spem adferunt, ut tamquam in herbis non fallacibus fructus appareat, non sunt illae quidem repudiandae, vetustas tamen suo loco conservanda; maxima est enim vis vetustatis et consuetudinis. 

But if novelties bring hope, so that, as it were, fruit appears in unfailing plants, they are indeed not to be rejected, yet old age must be preserved in its own place; for the greatest power lies in antiquity and habit. 

Quin in ipso equo, cuius modo feci mentionem, si nulla res impediat, nemo est, quin eo, quo consuevit, libentius utatur quam intractato et novo. 

Indeed, in the very horse of which I just made mention, if nothing hinders, there is no one who does not prefer to use the one he is accustomed to rather than an untrained and new one. 

Nec vero in hoc quod est animal, sed in iis etiam quae sunt inanima, consuetudo valet, cum locis ipsis delectemur, montuosis etiam et silvestribus, in quibus diutius commorati sumus. 

Nor indeed in this which is an animal, but even in those things which are inanimate, habit is strong, since we are delighted by places themselves, even mountainous and wooded ones, in which we have dwelled for a longer time. 

[69] Sed maximum est in amicitia parem esse inferiori. 

But the greatest thing in friendship is to be equal to an inferior. 

Saepe enim excellentiae quaedam sunt, qualis erat Scipionis in nostro, ut ita dicam, grege. 

For there are often certain superiorities, such as Scipio's was in our, so to speak, flock. 

Numquam se ille Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio anteposuit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis, Q. vero Maximum fratrem, egregium virum omnino, sibi nequaquam parem, quod is anteibat aetate, tamquam superiorem colebat suosque omnes per se posse esse ampliores volebat. 

He never preferred himself to Philus, never to Rupilius, never to Mummius, never to friends of inferior rank, but he honored his brother Quintus Maximus, a thoroughly excellent man, by no means his equal, as a superior because he was older, and he wished all his own men to be able to be more distinguished by their own efforts. 

[70] Quod faciendum imitandumque est omnibus, ut, si quam praestantiam virtutis, ingenii, fortunae consecuti sint, impertiant ea suis communicentque cum proximis, ut, si parentibus nati sint humilibus, si propinquos habeant imbecilliore vel animo vel fortuna, eorum augeant opes eisque honori sint et dignitati. 

This ought to be done and imitated by all, that if they have attained any eminence of virtue, talent, or fortune, they should share these with their own and communicate them with those closest to them, so that if they were born of humble parents, if they have relatives of weaker spirit or fortune, they should increase their resources and be an honor and dignity to them. 

Ut in fabulis, qui aliquamdiu propter ignorationem stirpis et generis in famulatu fuerunt, cum cogniti sunt et aut deorum aut regum filii inventi, retinent tamen caritatem in pastores, quos patres multos annos esse duxerunt. 

As in stories, those who for some time were in servitude due to ignorance of their lineage and birth, when they are recognized and found to be sons of either gods or kings, nevertheless retain affection for the shepherds whom they believed to be their fathers for many years. 

Quod est multo profecto magis in veris patribus certisque faciendum. 

Which indeed is much more certainly to be done for true and certain fathers. 

Fructus enim ingenii et virtutis omnisque praestantiae tum maximus capitur, cum in proximum quemque confertur. 

For the fruit of talent and virtue and all eminence is then greatest when it is bestowed upon one's nearest kin. 

[71] Ut igitur ii qui sunt in amicitiae coniunctionisque necessitudine superiores, exaequare se cum inferioribus debent, sic inferiores non dolere se a suis aut ingenio aut fortuna aut dignitate superari. 

Therefore, just as those who are superior in the bond and connection of friendship ought to make themselves equal with their inferiors, so inferiors ought not to grieve that they are surpassed by their friends either in talent or fortune or dignity. 

Quorum plerique aut queruntur semper aliquid aut etiam exprobrant, eoque magis, si habere se putant, quod officiose et amice et cum labore aliquo suo factum queant dicere. 

Most of these either always complain about something or even reproach, and all the more so if they think they have something which they can say was done dutifully and kindly and with some effort of their own. 

Odiosum sane genus hominum officia exprobrantium; quae meminisse debet is in quem conlata sunt, non commemorare, qui contulit. 

Certainly an odious type of men are those who reproach kindnesses; these ought to be remembered by him upon whom they were bestowed, not recounted by him who bestowed them. 

[72] Quam ob rem ut ii qui superiores sunt submittere se debent in amicitia, sic quodam modo inferiores extollere. 

Therefore, just as those who are superior ought to humble themselves in friendship, so in a way they ought to elevate their inferiors. 

Sunt enim quidam qui molestas amicitias faciunt, cum ipsi se contemni putant; quod non fere contingit nisi iis qui etiam contemnendos se arbitrantur; qui hac opinione non modo verbis sed etiam opere levandi sunt. 

For there are some who make friendships troublesome, when they themselves think they are despised; which hardly happens except to those who also think themselves contemptible; who, with this opinion, ought to be relieved not only by words but also by deeds. 

[73] Tantum autem cuique tribuendum, primum quantum ipse efficere possis, deinde etiam quantum ille quem diligas atque adiuves, sustinere. 

However, only so much should be granted to each, first, as much as you yourself can accomplish, then also as much as he whom you love and help can sustain. 

Non enim neque tu possis, quamvis excellas, omnes tuos ad honores amplissimos perducere, ut Scipio P. Rupilium potuit consulem efficere, fratrem eius L. non potuit. 

For you cannot, however much you excel, lead all your friends to the highest honors, just as Scipio was able to make Publius Rupilius consul, but could not do the same for his brother Lucius. 

Quod si etiam possis quidvis deferre ad alterum, videndum est tamen, quid ille possit sustinere. 

But if you could even bestow anything you wish upon another, you must nevertheless see what he can sustain. 

[74] Omnino amicitiae corroboratis iam confirmatisque et ingeniis et aetatibus iudicandae sunt, nec si qui ineunte aetate venandi aut pilae studiosi fuerunt, eos habere necessarios quos tum eodem studio praeditos dilexerunt. 

In general, friendships should be judged when both talents and ages are already strengthened and confirmed, and one should not consider as indispensable those whom, in early youth, one loved because they were devoted to hunting or ball-playing. 

Isto enim modo nutrices et paedagogi iure vetustatis plurimum benevolentiae postulabunt; qui neglegendi quidem non sunt sed alio quodam modo aestimandi. 

For in that way, nurses and tutors will demand a great deal of goodwill by right of long association; and these, though not to be neglected, are to be valued in a certain different way. 

Aliter amicitiae stabiles permanere non possunt. 

Otherwise, stable friendships cannot endure. 

Dispares enim mores disparia studia sequuntur, quorum dissimilitudo dissociat amicitias; nec ob aliam causam ullam boni improbis, improbi bonis amici esse non possunt, nisi quod tanta est inter eos, quanta maxima potest esse, morum studiorumque distantia. 

For dissimilar characters follow dissimilar pursuits, the dissimilarity of which breaks up friendships; nor for any other reason can good men be friends with bad, or bad with good, except that there is between them such a great distance of characters and pursuits as can possibly exist. 

[75] Recte etiam praecipi potest in amicitiis, ne intemperata quaedam benevolentia, quod persaepe fit, impediat magnas utilitates amicorum. 

It can also be rightly advised in friendships that a certain unrestrained goodwill, which very often happens, should not impede great advantages for friends. 

Nec enim, ut ad fabulas redeam, Troiam Neoptolemus capere potuisset, si Lycomedem, apud quem erat educatus, multis cum lacrimis iter suum impedientem audire voluisset. 

For, to return to fables, Neoptolemus could not have captured Troy, if he had wished to listen to Lycomedes, with whom he had been educated, impeding his journey with many tears. 

Et saepe incidunt magnae res, ut discedendum sit ab amicis; quas qui impedire vult, quod desiderium non facile ferat, is et infirmus est mollisque natura et ob eam ipsam causam in amicitia parum iustus. 

And often great matters arise, so that one must depart from friends; and he who wishes to hinder these, because he cannot easily bear the separation, is both weak and soft by nature and for that very reason not sufficiently just in friendship. 

[76] Atque in omni re considerandum est et quid postules ab amico et quid patiare a te impetrari. 

And in every matter, it must be considered both what you demand from a friend and what you allow to be obtained from you. 

Est etiam quaedam calamitas in amicitiis dimittendis non numquam necessaria; iam enim a sapientium familiaritatibus ad vulgares amicitias oratio nostra delabitur. 

There is also a certain, sometimes necessary, misfortune in dismissing friendships; for now our discussion descends from the intimacies of the wise to common friendships. 

Erumpunt saepe vitia amicorum tum in ipsos amicos, tum in alienos, quorum tamen ad amicos redundet infamia. 

Often the faults of friends burst forth, sometimes against the friends themselves, sometimes against outsiders, yet their infamy redounds to the friends. 

Tales igitur amicitiae sunt remissione usus eluendae et, ut Catonem dicere audivi, dissuendae magis quam discindendae, nisi quaedam admodum intolerabilis iniuria exarserit, ut neque rectum neque honestum sit nec fieri possit, ut non statim alienatio disiunctioque faciunda sit. 

Such friendships, therefore, are to be cleansed by discontinuing their use and, as I heard Cato say, to be unstitched rather than torn apart, unless some utterly intolerable injury has blazed forth, so that it is neither right nor honorable, nor possible, that alienation and separation should not be made at once.