De Amicitia 4: Eternal Friendship – The Bond of the Good

[77] Sin autem aut morum aut studiorum commutatio quaedam, ut fieri solet, facta erit aut in rei publicae partibus dissensio intercesserit (loquor enim iam, ut paulo ante dixi, non de sapientium sed de communibus amicitiis), cavendum erit, ne non solum amicitiae depositae, sed etiam inimicitiae susceptae videantur. 

But if, however, a certain change of character or pursuits, as usually happens, has occurred, or if disagreement has arisen in political factions (for I am now speaking, as I said a little earlier, not of the friendships of the wise but of common ones), it will be necessary to take care lest not only friendships seem abandoned, but enmities also seem undertaken. 

Nihil est enim turpius quam cum eo bellum gerere quocum familiariter vixeris. 

For nothing is more disgraceful than to wage war with one with whom you have lived intimately. 

Ab amicitia Q. Pompei meo nomine se removerat, ut scitis, Scipio; propter dissensionem autem, quae erat in re publica, alienatus est a collega nostro Metello; utrumque egit graviter, auctoritate et offensione animi non acerba. 

From the friendship of Quintus Pompeius, Scipio had withdrawn, as you know, in my name; and on account of the disagreement which existed in the republic, he became estranged from our colleague Metellus; he acted gravely in both instances, with authority and without bitter resentment. 

[78] Quam ob rem primum danda opera est ne qua amicorum discidia fiant; sin tale aliquid evenerit, ut exstinctae potius amicitiae quam oppressae videantur. 

Therefore, first, effort must be given that no ruptures of friendships occur; but if anything of the sort should happen, that friendships seem extinguished rather than suppressed. 

Cavendum vero ne etiam in graves inimicitias convertant se amicitiae; ex quibus iurgia, maledicta, contumeliae gignuntur. 

But it must truly be guarded against that friendships do not even turn into grave enmities; from which quarrels, slanders, and insults are produced. 

Quae tamen si tolerabiles erunt, ferendae sunt, et hic honos veteri amicitiae tribuendus, ut is in culpa sit qui faciat, non is qui patiatur iniuriam. 

Which, however, if they are tolerable, must be endured, and this honor must be paid to old friendship, that he who causes the injury is in fault, not he who suffers it. 

Omnino omnium horum vitiorum atque incommodorum una cautio est atque una provisio, ut ne nimis cito diligere incipiant neve non dignos. 

Altogether, for all these faults and disadvantages, there is one caution and one provision: that men should not begin to love too quickly, nor those unworthy. 

[79] Digni autem sunt amicitia quibus in ipsis inest causa cur diligantur. 

But those are worthy of friendship in whom there is inherent a reason why they should be loved. 

Rarum genus. 

A rare kind. 

Et quidem omnia praeclara rara, nec quicquam difficilius quam reperire quod sit omni ex parte in suo genere perfectum. 

And indeed all excellent things are rare, nor is anything more difficult than to find that which is perfect in every respect in its own kind. 

Sed plerique neque in rebus humanis quicquam bonum norunt, nisi quod fructuosum sit, et amicos tamquam pecudes eos potissimum diligunt ex quibus sperant se maximum fructum esse capturos. 

But most men know nothing good in human affairs unless it is fruitful, and they particularly love friends as if they were livestock, from whom they hope to gain the greatest profit. 

[80] Ita pulcherrima illa et maxime naturali carent amicitia per se et propter se expetita nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt, haec vis amicitiae et qualis et quanta sit. 

Thus they lack that most beautiful and most natural friendship, sought for its own sake and on account of itself, nor are they themselves an example of what kind and how great this power of friendship is. 

Ipse enim se quisque diligit, non ut aliquam a se ipse mercedem exigat caritatis suae, sed quod per se sibi quisque carus est. 

For each person loves himself, not so that he may demand some reward for his affection from himself, but because each person is dear to himself for his own sake. 

Quod nisi idem in amicitiam transferetur, verus amicus numquam reperietur; est enim is qui est tamquam alter idem. 

But unless this same principle is transferred to friendship, a true friend will never be found; for a true friend is, as it were, a second self. 

[81] Quod si hoc apparet in bestiis, volucribus, nantibus, agrestibus, cicuribus, feris, primum ut se ipsae diligant (id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur), deinde ut requirant atque appetant ad quas se applicent eiusdem generis animantis, idque faciunt cum desiderio et cum quadam similitudine amoris humani, quanto id magis in homine fit natura! 

But if this appears in beasts, birds, swimming creatures, wild animals, tame ones, wild ones, first that they love themselves (for that is born equally with every living creature), then that they seek and desire living creatures of the same kind to whom they may attach themselves, and they do this with longing and with a certain likeness of human love, how much more naturally does this happen in man! 

Qui et se ipse diligit et alterum anquirit, cuius animum ita cum suo misceat ut efficiat paene unum ex duobus. 

He who both loves himself and seeks another, whose soul he may so blend with his own as to make almost one out of two. 

[82] Sed plerique perverse, ne dicam impudenter, habere talem amicum volunt, quales ipsi esse non possunt, quaeque ipsi non tribuunt amicis, haec ab iis desiderant. 

But most people perversely, not to say impudently, wish to have such a friend as they themselves cannot be, and they desire from others what they themselves do not grant to their friends. 

Par est autem primum ipsum esse virum bonum, tum alterum similem sui quaerere. 

It is right, however, first for a man to be good himself, then to seek another similar to himself. 

In talibus ea, quam iam dudum tractamus, stabilitas amicitiae confirmari potest, cum homines benevolentia coniuncti primum cupiditatibus iis quibus ceteri serviunt imperabunt, deinde aequitate iustitiaque gaudebunt, omniaque alter pro altero suscipiet, neque quicquam umquam nisi honestum et rectum alter ab altero postulabit, neque solum colent inter se ac diligent sed etiam verebuntur. 

In such men, that stability of friendship, which we have long been discussing, can be confirmed, when men united by goodwill will first control the desires to which others are enslaved, then they will rejoice in fairness and justice, and each will undertake everything for the other, and neither will ever demand anything from the other except what is honorable and right, and they will not only cherish and love each other but also revere each other. 

Nam maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit qui ex ea tollit verecundiam. 

For he takes away the greatest ornament of friendship who takes modesty out of it. 

[83] Itaque in iis perniciosus est error qui existimant libidinum peccatorumque omnium patere in amicitia licentiam; virtutum amicitia adiutrix a natura data est, non vitiorum comes, ut, quoniam solitaria non posset virtus ad ea, quae summa sunt, pervenire, coniuncta et consociata cum altera perveniret. 

And so the error of those who think that license for all lusts and sins is open in friendship is pernicious; friendship was given by nature as an aid to virtues, not as a companion to vices, so that, since virtue alone could not attain those things which are highest, it might attain them when joined and associated with another. 

Quae si quos inter societas aut est aut fuit aut futura est, eorum est habendus ad summum naturae bonum optumus beatissimusque comitatus. 

And if such a partnership exists or has existed or will exist among any, theirs is to be considered the best and most blessed companionship for the highest good of nature. 

[84] Haec est, inquam, societas, in qua omnia insunt, quae putant homines expetenda, honestas, gloria, tranquillitas animi atque iucunditas, ut et, cum haec adsint, beata vita sit et sine his esse non possit. 

This is, I say, the partnership in which all things that men think are to be sought are contained: honor, glory, tranquility of mind, and pleasantness, so that, when these are present, life is blessed and without them it cannot be. 

Quod cum optimum maximumque sit, si id volumus adipisci, virtuti opera danda est, sine qua nec amicitiam neque ullam rem expetendam consequi possumus; ea vero neglecta qui se amicos habere arbitrantur, tum se denique errasse sentiunt, cum eos gravis aliquis casus experiri cogit. 

And since this is the best and greatest thing, if we wish to obtain it, effort must be given to virtue, without which we can attain neither friendship nor any desirable thing; but those who, neglecting it, think they have friends, then finally realize they have erred, when some serious misfortune compels them to test them. 

[85] Quocirca (dicendum est enim saepius), cum iudicaris, diligere oportet, non, cum dilexeris, iudicare. 

Therefore (for it must be said more often), when you have judged, you ought to love, not, when you have loved, to judge. 

Sed cum multis in rebus neglegentia plectimur, tum maxime in amicis et diligendis et colendis; praeposteris enim utimur consiliis et acta agimus, quod vetamur vetere proverbio. 

But while in many matters we are punished by negligence, then most especially in choosing and cultivating friends; for we use perverse counsels and do what has already been done, which we are forbidden to do by an old proverb. 

Nam implicati ultro et citro vel usu diuturno vel etiam officiis repente in medio cursu amicitias exorta aliqua offensione disrumpimus. 

For having become entangled back and forth either by long use or even by services, we suddenly break off friendships in mid-course when some offense arises. 

[86] Quo etiam magis vituperanda est rei maxime necessariae tanta incuria. 

By which, moreover, so great a neglect of a most necessary thing is all the more to be blamed. 

Una est enim amicitia in rebus humanis, de cuius utilitate omnes uno ore consentiunt. 

For friendship is the one thing in human affairs concerning whose utility all agree with one voice. 

Quamquam a multis virtus ipsa contemnitur et venditatio quaedam atque ostentatio esse dicitur; multi divitias despiciunt, quos parvo contentos tenuis victus cultusque delectat; honores vero, quorum cupiditate quidam inflammantur, quam multi ita contemnunt, ut nihil inanius, nihil esse levius existiment! itemque cetera, quae quibusdam admirabilia videntur, permulti sunt qui pro nihilo putent; de amicitia omnes ad unum idem sentiunt, et ii qui ad rem publicam se contulerunt, et ii qui rerum cognitione doctrinaque delectantur, et ii qui suum negotium gerunt otiosi, postremo ii qui se totos tradiderunt voluptatibus, sine amicitia vitam esse nullam, si modo velint aliqua ex parte liberaliter vivere. 

Although virtue itself is scorned by many and said to be a kind of boasting and display; many despise riches, whom a modest way of life and simple attire delight, being content with little; but as for honors, with the desire for which some are inflamed, how many so despise them that they think nothing is more empty, nothing more trivial! and likewise other things which seem admirable to some, very many think they are worth nothing; about friendship, all to a man feel the same, both those who have devoted themselves to public affairs, and those who delight in the knowledge of things and learning, and those who manage their own business at leisure, finally those who have entirely given themselves over to pleasures, that life is nothing without friendship, if only they wish to live liberally in any respect. 

[87] Serpit enim nescio quo modo per omnium vitas amicitia nec ullam aetatis degendae rationem patitur esse expertem sui. 

For friendship creeps, I know not how, through the lives of all, nor does it allow any plan for living out one's age to be devoid of it. 

Quin etiam si quis asperitate ea est et immanitate naturae, congressus ut hominum fugiat atque oderit, qualem fuisse Athenis Timonem nescio quem accepimus, tamen is pati non possit, ut non anquirat aliquem, apud quem evomat virus acerbitatis suae. 

Indeed, even if someone is of such harshness and savagery of nature that he shuns and hates the company of men, such as we have heard a certain Timon was at Athens, yet he cannot endure not to seek someone with whom to disgorge the venom of his bitterness. 

Atque hoc maxime iudicaretur, si quid tale posset contingere, ut aliquis nos deus ex hac hominum frequentia tolleret et in solitudine uspiam collocaret atque ibi suppeditans omnium rerum, quas natura desiderat, abundantiam et copiam hominis omnino aspiciendi potestatem eriperet. 

And this would be judged most strongly if such a thing could happen, that some god would take us from this throng of men and place us somewhere in solitude, and there, supplying an abundance and plenty of all things that nature desires, would take away the power of seeing any human being at all. 

Quis tam esset ferreus qui eam vitam ferre posset, cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum omnium solitudo? 

Who would be so iron-hearted as to be able to bear such a life, and from whom solitude would not take away the fruit of all pleasures? 

[88] Verum ergo illud est quod a Tarentino Archyta, ut opinor, dici solitum nostros senes commemorare audivi ab aliis senibus auditum: "si quis in caelum ascendisset naturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderum perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei fore; quae iucundissima fuisset, si aliquem, cui narraret, habuisset." 

Therefore, that saying is true which I heard our old men recount, said by Archytas of Tarentum, as I think, and heard by other old men: "if anyone had ascended into heaven and surveyed the nature of the world and the beauty of the stars, that admiration would be unpleasant to him; which would have been most delightful if he had had someone to whom he might tell it." 

Sic natura solitarium nihil amat semperque ad aliquod tamquam adminiculum adnititur; quod in amicissimo quoque dulcissimum est. 

Thus nature loves nothing solitary and always strives toward some support, as it were; which is sweetest in a very dear friend. 

Sed cum tot signis eadem natura declaret, quid velit, anquirat, desideret, tamen obsurdescimus nescio quo modo nec ea, quae ab ea monemur, audimus. 

But although nature herself declares by so many signs what she wishes, seeks, desires, nevertheless we become deaf in some way and do not hear those things of which we are admonished by her. 

Est enim varius et multiplex usus amicitiae, multaeque causae suspicionum offensionumque dantur, quas tum evitare, tum elevare, tum ferre sapientis est; una illa sublevanda offensio est, ut et utilitas in amicitia et fides retineatur: nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, et haec accipienda amice, cum benevole fiunt. 

For the use of friendship is varied and manifold, and many causes of suspicions and offenses are given, which it is the part of a wise man sometimes to avoid, sometimes to lessen, sometimes to bear; that one offense must be removed, so that both utility in friendship and loyalty may be retained: for friends are often to be admonished and rebuked, and these things are to be received kindly, when they are done benevolently. 

[89] Sed nescio quo modo verum est, quod in Andria familiaris meus dicit: Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit. 

But it is true in some way, what my friend says in the Andria: "Compliance produces friends, truth produces hatred." 

Molesta veritas, siquidem ex ea nascitur odium, quod est venenum amicitiae, sed obsequium multo molestius, quod peccatis indulgens praecipitem amicum ferri sinit; maxima autem culpa in eo, qui et veritatem aspernatur et in fraudem obsequio impellitur. 

Truth is troublesome, if indeed hatred, which is the poison of friendship, is born from it, but compliance is much more troublesome, because by indulging faults it allows a friend to be carried headlong; but the greatest fault is in him who both scorns the truth and is driven into deception by compliance. 

Omni igitur hac in re habenda ratio et diligentia est, primum ut monitio acerbitate, deinde ut obiurgatio contumelia careat; in obsequio autem, quoniam Terentiano verbo libenter utimur, comitas adsit, assentatio, vitiorum adiutrix, procul amoveatur, quae non modo amico, sed ne libero quidem digna est; aliter enim cum tyranno, aliter cum amico vivitur. 

Therefore, in all this matter, consideration and diligence must be employed, first that admonition be free from harshness, then that rebuke be free from insult; in compliance, however, since we gladly use the word of Terence, let affability be present, but flattery, the helper of vices, be far removed, which is worthy not only of a friend, but not even of a free man; for one lives otherwise with a tyrant, otherwise with a friend. 

[90] Cuius autem aures clausae veritati sunt, ut ab amico verum audire nequeat, huius salus desperanda est. 

Moreover, he whose ears are closed to truth, so that he cannot hear the truth from a friend, his salvation is to be despaired of. 

Scitum est enim illud Catonis, ut multa: "melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri quam eos amicos qui dulces videantur; illos verum saepe dicere, hos numquam." 

For that saying of Cato, like many of his, is clever: "Bitter enemies often deserve better of some than those friends who seem sweet; the former often speak the truth, the latter never." 

Atque illud absurdum, quod ii, qui monentur, eam molestiam quam debent capere non capiunt, eam capiunt qua debent vacare; peccasse enim se non anguntur, obiurgari moleste ferunt; quod contra oportebat, delicto dolere, correctione gaudere. 

And it is absurd that those who are admonished do not feel that annoyance which they ought to feel, but feel that which they ought to be free from; for they are not distressed by having erred, but they take it badly to be rebuked; whereas, on the contrary, they ought to grieve at the offense, and rejoice at the correction. 

[91] Ut igitur et monere et moneri proprium est verae amicitiae et alterum libere facere, non aspere, alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter, sic habendum est nullam in amicitiis pestem esse maiorem quam adulationem, blanditiam, assentationem; quamvis enim multis nominibus est hoc vitium notandum levium hominum atque fallacium ad voluntatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad veritatem. 

Therefore, just as it is characteristic of true friendship both to admonish and to be admonished, and for the one to do it freely, not harshly, the other to receive it patiently, not rebelliously, so it must be held that there is no greater plague in friendships than adulation, flattery, and obsequiousness; for by however many names this vice of frivolous and deceitful men, who speak everything to please and nothing for truth, must be marked. 

[92] Cum autem omnium rerum simulatio vitiosa est (tollit enim iudicium veri idque adulterat), tum amicitiae repugnat maxime; delet enim veritatem, sine qua nomen amicitiae valere non potest. 

Moreover, since the pretense of all things is vicious (for it removes judgment of the truth and falsifies it), it is then most contrary to friendship; for it destroys truth, without which the name of friendship cannot be strong. 

Nam cum amicitiae vis sit in eo, ut unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus, qui id fieri poterit, si ne in uno quidem quoque unus animus erit idemque semper, sed varius, commutabilis, multiplex? 

For when the power of friendship lies in this, that one soul, as it were, is made from many, how will that be possible if not even in each single person there will be one and the same soul always, but varied, changeable, manifold? 

[93] Quid enim potest esse tam flexibile, tam devium quam animus eius qui ad alterius non modo sensum ac voluntatem sed etiam vultum atque nutum convertitur? 

For what can be as flexible, as devious as the mind of one who is turned not only to another's feeling and will, but even to his expression and nod? 

Negat quis, nego; ait, aio; postremo imperavi egomet mihi Omnia adsentari, ut ait idem Terentius, sed ille in Gnathonis persona, quod amici genus adhibere omnino levitatis est. 

"If someone denies, I deny; if he affirms, I affirm"; finally, "I commanded myself to agree to everything," as the same Terence says, but he in the character of Gnatho, which kind of friend it is altogether a sign of frivolity to employ. 

[94] Multi autem Gnathonum similes cum sint loco, fortuna, fama superiores, horum est assentatio molesta, cum ad vanitatem accessit auctoritas. 

But since many who are similar to Gnatho are superior in rank, fortune, and reputation, the flattery of these is troublesome, when authority is added to vanity. 

[95] Secerni autem blandus amicus a vero et internosci tam potest adhibita diligentia quam omnia fucata et simulata a sinceris atque veris. 

Moreover, a flattering friend can be separated from a true one and distinguished by applying diligence, just as all things painted and simulated can be distinguished from genuine and true things. 

Contio, quae ex imperitissimis constat, tamen iudicare solet quid intersit inter popularem, id est assentatorem et levem civem, et inter constantem et severum et gravem. 

An assembly, which consists of the most inexperienced, is nevertheless accustomed to judge what the difference is between a popular citizen, that is, a flatterer and a frivolous citizen, and between a constant, severe, and grave one. 

[96] Quibus blanditiis C. Papirius nuper influebat in auris contionis, cum ferret legem de tribunis plebis reficiendis! 

With what flatteries Gaius Papirius was recently pouring into the ears of the assembly, when he was proposing a law about reappointing the tribunes of the plebs! 

Dissuasimus nos; sed nihil de me, de Scipione dicam libentius. 

We opposed it; but there is nothing I would speak of more gladly than myself and Scipio. 

Quanta illi, di immortales, fuit gravitas, quanta in oratione maiestas! 

What gravity he had, immortal gods, what majesty in his speech! 

Ut facile ducem populi Romani, non comitem diceres. 

So that you would easily have said he was the leader of the Roman people, not a follower. 

Sed adfuistis, et est in manibus oratio. 

But you were present, and the speech is in your hands. 

Itaque lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est. 

And so the popular law was rejected by the people's votes. 

Atque, ut ad me redeam, meministis, Q. Maximo, fratre Scipionis, et L. Mancino consulibus, quam popularis lex de sacerdotiis C. Licini Crassi videbatur! 

And, to return to myself, you remember how popular the law about priesthoods by Gaius Licinius Crassus seemed, when Quintus Maximus, Scipio’s brother, and Lucius Mancinus were consuls! 

Cooptatio enim collegiorum ad populi beneficium transferebatur; atque is primus instituit in forum versus agere cum populo.

For the right of co-opting into priestly colleges was being transferred to the benefit of the people; and he was the first to begin performing speeches in verse with the people in the forum.

Tamen illius vendibilem orationem religio deorum immortalium nobis defendentibus facile vincebat.

Yet the religious reverence for the immortal gods, with us defending it, easily overcame his saleable rhetoric.

Atque id actum est praetore me quinquennio ante quam consul sum factus; ita re magis quam summa auctoritate causa illa defensa est.

And that happened when I was praetor, five years before I became consul; thus the case was defended more by the matter itself than by the highest authority.

[97] Quod si in scaena, id est in contione, in qua rebus fictis et adumbratis loci plurimum est, tamen verum valet, si modo id patefactum et illustratum est, quid in amicitia fieri oportet, quae tota veritate perpenditur?

But if on the stage, that is, in the assembly, where there is the greatest room for false and shadowy things, truth still prevails—if only it is revealed and brought to light—then what must happen in friendship, which is wholly measured by truth?

In qua nisi, ut dicitur, apertum pectus videas tuumque ostendas, nihil fidum, nihil exploratum habeas, ne amare quidem aut amari, cum, id quam vere fiat, ignores.

In which, unless, as they say, you see an open heart and show your own, you have nothing trustworthy, nothing clear, you cannot even love or be loved, since you do not know how truly that is done.

Quamquam ista assentatio, quamvis perniciosa sit, nocere tamen nemini potest nisi ei qui eam recipit atque ea delectatur.

Although that flattery, however harmful, can hurt no one except him who receives it and delights in it.

Ita fit, ut is assentatoribus patefaciat aures suas maxime, qui ipse sibi assentetur et se maxime ipse delectet.

Thus it comes about that he opens his ears most to flatterers who flatters himself and takes the greatest pleasure in himself.

[98] Omnino est amans sui virtus; optime enim se ipsa novit, quamque amabilis sit, intellegit.

Virtue is, in general, a lover of itself; for it knows itself best and understands how lovable it is.

Ego autem non de virtute nunc loquor sed de virtutis opinione.

But I am not now speaking of virtue itself, but of the opinion of virtue.

Virtute enim ipsa non tam multi praediti esse quam videri volunt.

For not many are truly endowed with virtue, though many wish to seem so.

Hos delectat assentatio, his fictus ad ipsorum voluntatem sermo cum adhibetur, orationem illam vanam testimonium esse laudum suarum putant.

Flattery delights these men, and when speech shaped to their will is presented to them, they consider that empty speech to be a testimony of their praises.

Nulla est igitur haec amicitia, cum alter verum audire non vult, alter ad mentiendum paratus est.

This, therefore, is no friendship, when one does not want to hear the truth, and the other is ready to lie.

Nec parasitorum in comoediis assentatio faceta nobis videretur, nisi essent milites gloriosi.

Nor would the flattery of parasites in comedies seem amusing to us, unless there were braggart soldiers.

Magnas vero agere gratias Thais mihi?

“So Thais wants to give me great thanks?”

Satis erat respondere: 'magnas'; 'ingentes' inquit.

It would have been enough to reply “great thanks”; “enormous,” he says.

Semper auget assentator id, quod is cuius ad voluntatem dicitur vult esse magnum.

The flatterer always exaggerates what the one he is trying to please wants to be great.

[99] Quam ob rem, quamquam blanda ista vanitas apud eos valet qui ipsi illam allectant et invitant, tamen etiam graviores constantioresque admonendi sunt, ut animadvertant, ne callida assentatione capiantur.

Therefore, although that alluring vanity holds sway over those who themselves invite and welcome it, even more serious and steadfast individuals must be warned to take care lest they be caught by cunning flattery.

Aperte enim adulantem nemo non videt, nisi qui admodum est excors; callidus ille et occultus ne se insinuet, studiose cavendum est; nec enim facillime agnoscitur, quippe qui etiam adversando saepe assentetur et litigare se simulans blandiatur atque ad extremum det manus vincique se patiatur, ut is qui illusus sit plus vidisse videatur.

For no one fails to see an open flatterer, unless he is utterly senseless; but one must diligently guard against the cunning and hidden flatterer, lest he insinuate himself. Indeed, he is not easily recognized, since he often flatters even by opposing, and feigning dispute, he cajoles, and at last yields and allows himself to be overcome, so that the one who has been deceived may seem to have shown greater insight.

Quid autem turpius quam illudi?

What, however, is more disgraceful than to be deceived?

Quod ut ne accidat, magis cavendum est.

To prevent this from happening, one must be even more cautious.

Ut me hodie ante omnes comicos stultos senes Versaris atque illusseris lautissume.

"How today you have tricked and thoroughly mocked me before all foolish old men in comedies."

[100] Haec enim etiam in fabulis stultissima persona est improvidorum et credulorum senum.

For this is the most foolish character even in plays: that of improvident and credulous old men.

Sed nescio quo pacto ab amicitiis perfectorum hominum, id est sapientium (de hac dico sapientia, quae videtur in hominem cadere posse), ad leves amicitias defluxit oratio.

But somehow, I know not how, my discourse has drifted from the friendships of perfect men—that is, of the wise (I speak of that wisdom which seems attainable by man)—to trivial friendships.

Quam ob rem ad illa prima redeamus eaque ipsa concludamus aliquando.

Therefore, let us return to those first principles and at last conclude them.

Virtus, virtus, inquam, C. Fanni, et tu, Q. Muci, et conciliat amicitias et conservat.

Virtue, virtue, I say, Gaius Fannius, and you, Quintus Mucius, both unites friendships and preserves them.

In ea est enim convenientia rerum, in ea stabilitas, in ea constantia; quae cum se extulit et ostendit suum lumen et idem aspexit agnovitque in alio, ad id se admovet vicissimque accipit illud, quod in altero est; ex quo exardescit sive amor sive amicitia; utrumque enim dictum est ab amando; amare autem nihil est aliud nisi eum ipsum diligere, quem ames, nulla indigentia, nulla utilitate quaesita; quae tamen ipsa efflorescit ex amicitia, etiamsi tu eam minus secutus sis.

For in it is the harmony of things, in it stability, in it constancy; and when it has brought itself forth and shown its light, and has looked upon and recognized the same in another, it draws itself to that and in turn receives what is in the other; from this either love or friendship is kindled—for both are derived from loving. To love, however, is nothing else than to cherish the very person whom you love, with no need, no utility sought, though such utility itself blossoms from friendship, even if you have pursued it less.

[101] Hac nos adulescentes benevolentia senes illos, L. Paulum, M. Catonem, C. Galum, P. Nasicam, Ti. Gracchum, Scipionis nostri socerum, dileximus, haec etiam magis elucet inter aequales, ut inter me et Scipionem, L. Furium, P. Rupilium, Sp. Mummium.

With this goodwill, we young men cherished those elder statesmen: Lucius Paulus, Marcus Cato, Gaius Gallus, Publius Nasica, Tiberius Gracchus, and our Scipio's father-in-law. This goodwill shines forth even more brightly among equals, as between me and Scipio, Lucius Furius, Publius Rupilius, and Spurius Mummius.

Vicissim autem senes in adulescentium caritate acquiescimus, ut in vestra, ut in Q. Tuberonis; equidem etiam admodum adulescentis P. Rutili, A. Vergini familiaritate delector.

In turn, we old men find repose in the affection of young men, as in yours, and in Quintus Tubero's; indeed, I'm also delighted by the intimacy of the very young Publius Rutilius and Aulus Verginius.

Quoniamque ita ratio comparata est vitae naturaeque nostrae, ut alia ex alia aetas oriatur, maxime quidem optandum est, ut cum aequalibus possis, quibuscum tamquam e carceribus emissus sis, cum isdem ad calcem, ut dicitur, pervenire.

And since the course of our life and nature is so arranged that one age arises from another, it is indeed most to be wished that you may be able to reach the goal, as they say, with those of your own age with whom you were, as it were, released from the starting gates.

[102] Sed quoniam res humanae fragiles caducaeque sunt, semper aliqui anquirendi sunt quos diligamus et a quibus diligamur; caritate enim benevolentiaque sublata omnis est e vita sublata iucunditas.

But since human affairs are fragile and perishable, we must always seek out some people whom we may love and by whom we may be loved; for with affection and goodwill removed, all joy is removed from life.

Mihi quidem Scipio, quamquam est subito ereptus, vivit tamen semperque vivet; virtutem enim amavi illius viri, quae exstincta non est; nec mihi soli versatur ante oculos, qui illam semper in manibus habui, sed etiam posteris erit clara et insignis.

For my part, Scipio, though he was suddenly snatched away, lives nonetheless and will always live; for I loved the virtue of that man, which is not extinguished. Nor does it dwell only before my eyes, who always held it close, but it will also be bright and remarkable for posterity.

Nemo umquam animo aut spe maiora suscipiet, qui sibi non illius memoriam atque imaginem proponendam putet.

No one will ever undertake greater things in spirit or hope who does not believe that his memory and image should be set before them.

[103] Equidem ex omnibus rebus quas mihi aut fortuna aut natura tribuit, nihil habeo quod cum amicitia Scipionis possim comparare.

Indeed, of all the things which either fortune or nature has bestowed upon me, I have nothing that I can compare with the friendship of Scipio.

In hac mihi de re publica consensus, in hac rerum privatarum consilium, in eadem requies plena oblectationis fuit.

In this friendship, I found agreement concerning public affairs, in this, counsel concerning private matters, and in the same, rest full of delight.

Numquam illum ne minima quidem re offendi, quod quidem senserim, nihil audivi ex eo ipse quod nollem; una domus erat, idem victus, isque communis, neque solum militia, sed etiam peregrinationes rusticationesque communes.

I never offended him in even the slightest matter, as far as I could tell, nor did I hear anything from him myself that I didn't wish to; we had one home, the same shared diet, and not only military service but also journeys abroad and country stays were shared.

[104] Nam quid ego de studiis dicam cognoscendi semper aliquid atque discendi? in quibus remoti ab oculis populi omne otiosum tempus contrivimus.

For what shall I say about our eagerness always to learn and to discover something new? In these pursuits, removed from the public eye, we spent all our leisure time.

Quarum rerum recordatio et memoria si una cum illo occidisset, desiderium coniunctissimi atque amantissimi viri ferre nullo modo possem.

If the recollection and memory of these things had perished along with him, I would in no way be able to bear the longing for a man so closely united and so loving.

Sed nec illa exstincta sunt alunturque potius et augentur cogitatione et memoria mea, et si illis plane orbatus essem, magnum tamen adfert mihi aetas ipsa solacium.

But those things are not extinguished; rather, they are nourished and increased by my thought and memory. And even if I were utterly deprived of them, age itself nevertheless brings me great solace.

Diutius enim iam in hoc desiderio esse non possum.

For I can no longer remain in this longing for very long.

Omnia autem brevia tolerabilia esse debent, etiamsi magna sunt.

Moreover, all brief things ought to be tolerable, even if they are great.

Haec habui de amicitia quae dicerem.

These are the things I had to say about friendship.

Vos autem hortor ut ita virtutem locetis, sine qua amicitia esse non potest, ut ea excepta nihil amicitia praestabilius putetis.

But I exhort you to so place virtue, without which friendship cannot exist, that with it as the only exception, you consider nothing more excellent than friendship.