De Bello Gallico Book 8 (1–30)
1 Coactus assiduis tuis vocibus, Balbe, cum
cotidiana mea recusatio non difficultatis excusationem, sed inertiae videretur
deprecationem habere, rem difficillimam suscepi.
1 Compelled by your persistent urgings,
Balbus, since my daily refusal seemed to contain not an excuse of difficulty
but a plea of laziness, I undertook a most difficult task.
2 Caesaris nostri commentarios rerum gestarum
Galliae, non comparantibus superioribus atque insequentibus eius scriptis,
contexui novissimumque imperfectum ab rebus gestis Alexandriae confeci usque ad
exitum non quidem civilis dissensionis, cuius finem nullum videmus, sed vitae
Caesaris.
2 I connected the commentaries of our Caesar
on the deeds done in Gaul, which did not align with his earlier and later
writings, and I completed the final and unfinished one from the deeds at
Alexandria down to the end—not of the civil discord, whose conclusion we do not
see—but of Caesar's life.
3 Quos utinam qui legent scire possint quam
invitus susceperim scribendos, qua facilius caream stultitiae atque arrogantiae
crimine, qui me mediis interposuerim Caesaris scriptis.
3 Would that those who read them might know
how unwillingly I undertook to write them, so that I might more easily avoid
the charge of foolishness and arrogance for having inserted myself into the
middle of Caesar’s writings.
4 Constat enim inter omnes nihil tam operose
ab aliis esse perfectum, quod non horum elegantia commentariorum
superetur:
4 For it is agreed by all that nothing so
painstakingly finished by others is not surpassed by the elegance of these
commentaries:
5 qui sunt editi, ne scientia tantarum rerum
scriptoribus deesset, adeoque probantur omnium iudicio ut praerepta, non
praebita, facultas scriptoribus videatur.
5 which were published lest writers lack
knowledge of such great affairs, and are so approved by everyone’s judgment
that the opportunity for writers seems to have been snatched away, not
offered.
6 Cuius tamen rei maior nostra quam reliquorum
est admiratio: ceteri enim, quam bene atque emendate, nos etiam, quam facile
atque celeriter eos perfecerit scimus.
6 Yet our admiration for this is greater than
that of others: for others know how well and faultlessly he completed them, but
we also know how easily and swiftly he did so.
7 Erat autem in Caesare cum facultas atque
elegantia summa scribendi, tum verissima scientia suorum consiliorum
explicandorum.
7 For in Caesar there was not only the highest
capacity and elegance in writing, but also the truest knowledge for explaining
his own plans.
8 Mihi ne illud quidem accidit, ut Alexandrino
atque Africano bello interessem; quae bella quamquam ex parte nobis Caesaris
sermone sunt nota, tamen aliter audimus ea, quae rerum novitate aut admiratione
nos capiunt, aliter, quae pro testimonio sumus dicturi.
8 I did not even have the fortune to be
present at the Alexandrian and African wars; though these wars are in part
known to us from Caesar’s account, we hear differently those things that
captivate us by their novelty or wonder, and differently those we are to
recount as testimony.
9 Sed ego nimirum, dum omnes excusationis
causas colligo ne cum Caesare conferar, hoc ipsum crimen arrogantiae subeo,
quod me iudicio cuiusquam existimem posse cum Caesare comparari. Vale.
9 But I, no doubt, while collecting every
excuse so as not to be compared with Caesar, fall into this very charge of
arrogance—that I think myself, by anyone’s judgment, capable of being compared
with Caesar. Farewell.
[1]
1 Omni Gallia devicta Caesar cum a superiore
aestate nullum bellandi tempus intermisisset militesque hibernorum quiete
reficere a tantis laboribus vellet, complures eodem tempore civitates renovare
belli consilia nuntiabantur coniurationesque facere.
1 With all Gaul conquered, and Caesar having
allowed no pause for warfare since the previous summer, and wishing to refresh
the soldiers from such great labors with the rest of winter quarters, it was
reported that several states at the same time were renewing plans for war and
forming conspiracies.
2 Cuius rei verisimilis causa adferebatur,
quod Gallis omnibus cognitum esset neque ulla multitudine in unum locum coacta
resisti posse Romanis, nec, si diversa bella complures eodem tempore
intulissent civitates, satis auxili aut spati aut copiarum habiturum exercitum
populi Romani ad omnia persequenda; non esse autem alicui civitati sortem
incommodi recusandam, si tali mora reliquae possent se vindicare in
libertatem.
2 A plausible reason for this was given: that
it was known to all the Gauls that no assembled multitude could resist the
Romans, nor, if several states at the same time waged separate wars, would the
army of the Roman people have sufficient reinforcements, time, or resources to
pursue all of them; and that no single state ought to refuse its share of
hardship, if by such a delay the others might be able to recover their
freedom.
[2]
1 Quae ne opinio Gallorum confirmaretur,
Caesar Marcum Antonium quaestorem suis praefecit hibernis; ipse equitum
praesidio pridie Kal. Ianuarias ab oppido Bibracte proficiscitur ad legionem
XIII, quam non longe a finibus Aeduorum collocaverat in finibus Biturigum,
eique adiungit legionem XI, quae proxima fuerat.
1 To prevent this opinion of the Gauls from
being confirmed, Caesar placed Marcus Antonius, the quaestor, in charge of his
winter quarters; he himself, with a guard of cavalry, set out on the day before
the Kalends of January from the town of Bibracte to the Thirteenth Legion,
which he had stationed not far from the borders of the Aedui in the territory
of the Bituriges, and he joined to it the Eleventh Legion, which had been
nearest.
2 Binis cohortibus ad impedimenta tuenda
relictis reliquum exercitum in copiosissimos agros Biturigum inducit, qui, cum
latos fines et complura oppida haberent, unius legionis hibernis non potuerint
contineri quin bellum pararent coniurationesque facerent.
2 Leaving two cohorts to guard the baggage, he
led the rest of the army into the very fertile lands of the Bituriges, who,
since they had wide territories and many towns, could not be restrained by the
winter quarters of a single legion from preparing war and forming
conspiracies.
[3]
1 Repentino adventu Caesaris accidit, quod
imparatis disiectisque accidere fuit necesse, ut sine timore ullo rura colentes
prius ab equitatu opprimerentur quam confugere in oppida possent.
1 By Caesar’s sudden arrival, it happened—as
was inevitable for men unprepared and scattered—that those cultivating the
fields without any fear were overwhelmed by the cavalry before they could flee
to their towns.
2 Namque etiam illud vulgare incursionis
hostium signum, quod incendiis aedificiorum intellegi consuevit, Caesaris erat
interdicto sublatum, ne aut copia pabuli frumentique, si longius progredi
vellet, deficeretur, aut hostes incendiis terrerentur.
2 For even that common sign of an enemy
incursion, which is usually recognized by the burning of buildings, had been
suppressed by Caesar’s order, lest a supply of fodder and grain fail if he
wished to advance further, or lest the enemy be alarmed by the fires.
3 Multis hominum milibus captis perterriti
Bituriges; qui primum adventum potuerant effugere Romanorum, in finitimas
civitates aut privatis hospitiis confisi aut societate consiliorum
confugerant.
3 With many thousands of people captured, the
Bituriges were terrified; those who had been able to escape the Romans’ first
arrival had fled into neighboring states, relying either on private hospitality
or on shared plans.
4 Frustra: nam Caesar magnis itineribus
omnibus locis occurrit nec dat ulli civitati spatium de aliena potius quam de
domestica salute cogitandi; qua celeritate et fideles amicos retinebat et
dubitantes terrore ad condiciones pacis adducebat.
4 In vain: for Caesar, by forced marches,
appeared everywhere and gave no state time to think of the safety of others
rather than its own; by such speed, he both retained faithful allies and
brought the wavering by fear to accept terms of peace.
5 Tali condicione proposita Bituriges, cum
sibi viderent clementia Caesaris reditum patere in eius amicitiam finitimasque
civitates sine ulla poena dedisse obsides atque in fidem receptas esse, idem
fecerunt.
5 On such conditions being proposed, the
Bituriges, seeing that through Caesar’s clemency a return to his friendship was
open to them, and that neighboring states had given hostages without punishment
and had been received under his protection, did the same.
[4]
1 Caesar militibus pro tanto labore ac
patientia, qui brumalibus diebus itineribus difficillimis, frigoribus
intolerandis studiosissime permanserant in labore, ducenos sestertios,
centurionibus tot milia nummum praedae nomine condonanda pollicetur
legionibusque in hiberna remissis ipse se recipit die XXXX Bibracte.
1 Caesar promised to grant to the soldiers, in
return for such great toil and endurance—who had most zealously persevered in
labor during winter days, through the harshest marches and intolerable cold—two
hundred sesterces each, and to the centurions several thousands of sesterces in
the name of plunder; and having dismissed the legions to winter quarters, he
himself returned to Bibracte on the fortieth day.
2 Ibi cum ius diceret, Bituriges ad eum
legatos mittunt auxilium petitum contra Carnutes, quos intulisse bellum sibi
querebantur.
2 While he was administering justice there,
the Bituriges sent envoys to him seeking aid against the Carnutes, whom they
complained had made war upon them.
3 Qua re cognita, cum dies non amplius decem
et octo in hibernis esset moratus, legiones XIIII et VI ex hibernis ab Arare
educit, quas ibi collocatas explicandae rei frumentariae causa superiore
commentario demonstratum est: ita cum duabus legionibus ad persequendos Carnutes
proficiscitur.
3 On learning this, since he had delayed no
more than eighteen days in winter quarters, he led out the Fourteenth and Sixth
Legions from their quarters by the Arar, which, as was shown in the previous
commentary, had been stationed there to secure the grain supply: thus he set
out with two legions to pursue the Carnutes.
[5]
1 Cum fama exercitus ad hostes esset perlata,
calamitate ceterorum ducti Carnutes desertis vicis oppidisque, quae tolerandae
hiemis causa constitutis repente exiguis ad necessitatem aedificiis incolebant
(nuper enim devicti complura oppida dimiserant), dispersi profugiunt.
1 When news of the army reached the enemy, the
Carnutes, driven by the disaster of the others, abandoned their villages and
towns, which they had suddenly inhabited in small buildings hastily constructed
for the purpose of enduring winter (for, recently defeated, they had given up
several towns), and fled in scattered groups.
2 Caesar erumpentes eo maxime tempore
acerrimas tempestates cum subire milites nollet, in oppido Carnutum Cenabo
castra ponit atque in tecta partim Gallorum, partim quae coniectis celeriter
stramentis tentoriorum integendorum gratia erant inaedificata, milites
compegit.
2 Caesar, unwilling that the soldiers should
face the most severe storms breaking out at that very time, pitched camp in the
Carnute town of Cenabum, and quartered the soldiers partly in Gallic houses,
and partly in structures quickly built by throwing together straw to cover the
tents.
3 Equites tamen et auxiliarios pedites in
omnes partes mittit quascumque petisse dicebantur hostes; nec frustra:
3 However, he sent cavalry and auxiliary
infantry in all directions where the enemy were said to have gone; nor was it
in vain:
4 nam plerumque magna praeda potiti nostri
revertuntur. Oppressi Carnutes hiemis difficultate, terrore periculi, cum
tectis expulsi nullo loco diutius consistere auderent nec silvarum praesidio
tempestatibus durissimis tegi possent, dispersi magna parte amissa suorum
dissipantur in finitimas civitates.
4 for for the most part our men returned after
securing great plunder. The Carnutes, overwhelmed by the severity of winter and
the fear of danger, having been driven from their homes and daring to remain
nowhere for long, and unable to be protected by the shelter of the woods
against the harshest storms, were scattered, having lost a great part of their
people, and dispersed into neighboring states.
[6]
1 Caesar tempore anni difficillimo, cum satis
haberet convenientes manus dissipare, ne quod initium belli nasceretur,
quantumque in ratione esset, exploratum haberet sub tempus aestivorum nullum
summum bellum posse conflari, Gaium Trebonium cum duabus legionibus, quas secum
habebat, in hibernis Cenabi collocavit;
1 Caesar, at a most difficult time of year,
when he judged it sufficient to disperse assembling bands so that no new war
might arise, and had ascertained, so far as was reasonable, that no major war
could be kindled before the summer season, stationed Gaius Trebonius with two
legions, which he had with him, in winter quarters at Cenabum;
2 ipse, cum crebris legationibus Remorum
certior fieret Bellovacos, qui belli gloria Gallos omnes Belgasque praestabant,
finitimasque his civitates duce Correo Bellovaco et Commio Atrebate exercitus
comparare atque in unum locum cogere, ut omni multitudine in fines Suessionum,
qui Remis erant attributi, facerent impressionem, pertinere autem non tantum ad
dignitatem sed etiam ad salutem suam iudicaret nullam calamitatem socios optime
de re publica meritos accipere,
2 he himself, being informed by frequent
embassies from the Remi that the Bellovaci—who surpassed all the Gauls and
Belgae in martial renown—and the states neighboring them were assembling armies
under the leadership of Correus the Bellovacian and Commius the Atrebatian and
concentrating them in one place, in order to make an incursion with their
entire force into the territory of the Suessiones, who had been assigned to the
Remi, judged that it concerned not only his dignity but also his safety that no
calamity should befall allies who had deserved so well of the Roman state;
3 legionem ex hibernis evocat rursus
undecimam; litteras autem ad Gaium Fabium mittit, ut in fines Suessionum
legiones duas quas habebat adduceret, alteramque ex duabus ab Labieno arcessit.
Ita, quantum hibernorum opportunitas bellique ratio postulabat, perpetuo suo
labore in vicem legionibus expeditionum onus iniungebat.
3 he summoned the Eleventh Legion again from
winter quarters; he also sent letters to Gaius Fabius to lead into the
territory of the Suessiones the two legions he had with him, and he summoned
one of the two from Labienus. Thus, to the extent that the positioning of
winter quarters and the demands of the campaign allowed, he unceasingly shared
the burden of operations among the legions by his own continual exertion.
[7]
1 His copiis coactis ad Bellovacos
proficiscitur castrisque in eorum finibus positis equitum turmas dimittit in
omnes partes ad aliquos excipiendos ex quibus hostium consilia
cognosceret.
1 With these forces assembled, he set out
against the Bellovaci, and after establishing camp in their territory, he sent
squadrons of cavalry in all directions to capture persons from whom he might
learn the enemy’s plans.
2 Equites officio functi renuntiant paucos in
aedificiis esse inventos, atque hos, non qui agrorum colendorum causa
remansissent (namque esse undique diligenter demigratum), sed qui speculandi
causa essent remissi.
2 The cavalry, having fulfilled their duty,
reported that only a few persons had been found in the buildings, and that
these had not remained to cultivate the fields (for people had carefully
evacuated from all areas), but had been sent back for purposes of
reconnaissance.
3 A quibus cum quaereret Caesar quo loco
multitudo esset Bellovacorum quodve esset consilium eorum, inveniebat
Bellovacos omnes qui arma ferre possent in unum locum convenisse,
3 When Caesar asked them where the main force
of the Bellovaci was and what their intention was, he discovered that all the
Bellovaci who could bear arms had assembled in one place,
4 itemque Ambianos, Aulercos, Caletos,
Veliocasses, Atrebates; locum castris excelsum in silva circumdata palude
delegisse, impedimenta omnia in ulteriores silvas contulisse.
4 and likewise the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caleti,
Veliocasses, and Atrebates; that they had chosen an elevated position for their
camp within a wood surrounded by a marsh, and had moved all their baggage into
more remote woods.
5 Complures esse principes belli auctores, sed
multitudinem maxime Correo obtemperare, quod ei summo esse odio nomen populi Romani
intellexissent.
5 That there were many leaders who had
instigated the war, but that the mass especially obeyed Correus, because they
had perceived that he harbored the utmost hatred for the name of the Roman
people.
6 Paucis ante diebus ex his castris Atrebatem
Commium discessisse ad auxilia Germanorum adducenda; quorum et vicinitas
propinqua et multitudo esset infinita.
6 That a few days earlier, Commius the
Atrebatian had left this camp to bring up German auxiliaries, whose proximity
was near and whose numbers were countless.
7 Constituisse autem Bellovacos omnium
principum consensu, summa plebis cupiditate, si, ut diceretur, Caesar cum
tribus legionibus veniret, offerre se ad dimicandum, ne miseriore ac duriore
postea condicione cum toto exercitu decertare cogerentur;
7 Moreover, that the Bellovaci, by unanimous
agreement of their chiefs and with the greatest eagerness of the common people,
had resolved that, if—as was reported—Caesar should come with three legions,
they would offer battle, so that they might not later be compelled to fight
under more wretched and harsher conditions against his full army;
8 si maiores copias adduceret, in eo loco
permanere quem delegissent, pabulatione autem, quae propter anni tempus cum
exigua tum disiecta esset, et frumentatione et reliquo commeatu ex insidiis
prohibere Romanos.
8 but if he brought larger forces, they would
remain in the position they had chosen, and would, by ambushes, prevent the
Romans from securing fodder—which, due to the time of year, was both scarce and
scattered—and also from obtaining grain and other supplies.
[8]
1 Quae Caesar consentientibus pluribus cum
cognosset atque ea quae proponerentur consilia plena prudentiae longeque a
temeritate barbarorum remota esse iudicaret, omnibus rebus inserviendum
statuit, quo celerius hostis contempta sua paucitate prodiret in aciem.
1 When Caesar learned these things from
several agreeing sources, and judged that the plans proposed were full of
foresight and far removed from the rashness of barbarians, he decided that
everything should be done to bring the enemy, by despising his small numbers,
more quickly into battle.
2 Singularis enim virtutis veterrimas legiones
VII, VIII, VIIII habebat, summae spei delectaeque iuventutis XI, quae octavo
iam stipendio tamen in collatione reliquarum nondum eandem vetustatis ac
virtutis ceperat opinionem.
2 For he had the oldest legions, the Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth, of exceptional valor, and the Eleventh, composed of
carefully chosen youth of the highest promise, which, though now in its eighth
year of service, had not yet attained the same reputation for age and valor in
comparison with the others.
3 Itaque consilio advocato, rebus eis quae ad
se essent delatae omnibus expositis animos multitudinis confirmat.
3 Therefore, having called a council, and
having explained all the matters that had been reported to him, he strengthened
the spirits of the troops.
4 Si forte hostes trium legionum numero posset
elicere ad dimicandum, agminis ordinem ita constituit, ut legio septima,
octava, nona ante omnia irent impedimenta, deinde omnium impedimentorum agmen,
quod tamen erat mediocre, ut in expeditionibus esse consuevit, cogeret
undecima, ne maioris multitudinis species accidere hostibus posset quam ipsi
depoposcissent.
4 If by chance he could draw out the enemy to
fight at the sight of only three legions, he arranged the order of march so
that the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Legions would go before all the baggage;
then the Eleventh Legion would follow and gather the whole baggage train—which
was nevertheless modest, as is usual on expeditions—so that no appearance of a
greater force than what the enemy had wished for might occur to them.
5 Hac ratione paene quadrato agmine instructo
in conspectum hostium celerius opinione eorum exercitum adducit.
5 By this method, with his army drawn up in
almost square formation, he brought his troops into view of the enemy sooner
than they had expected.
[9]
1 Cum repente instructas velut in acie certo
gradu legiones accedere Galli viderent, quorum erant ad Caesarem plena fiduciae
consilia perlata, sive certaminis periculo sive subito adventu sive
exspectatione nostri consili copias instruunt pro castris nec loco superiore
decedunt.
1 When the Gauls suddenly saw the legions,
drawn up as in battle, advancing with steady step—whose plans full of
confidence had been reported to Caesar—whether from fear of the encounter, or
of the sudden arrival, or in anticipation of our strategy, they drew up their
forces in front of their camp and did not move down from their higher ground.
2 Caesar, etsi dimicare optaverat, tamen
admiratus tantam multitudinem hostium valle intermissa magis in altitudinem
depressa quam late patente castra castris hostium confert.
2 Caesar, although he had desired to engage in
battle, still, astonished at the great multitude of the enemy, established his
camp opposite theirs, with a valley in between, which was more deep than
wide.
3 Haec imperat vallo pedum XII muniri,
loriculam pro ratione eius altitudinis inaedificari; fossam duplicem pedum
denum quinum lateribus deprimi directis; turres excitari crebras in altitudinem
trium tabulatorum, pontibus traiectis constratisque coniungi, quorum frontes
viminea loricula munirentur; ut ab hostibus duplici fossa, duplici
propugnatorum ordine defenderentur,
3 He ordered the camp to be fortified with a
rampart twelve feet high, a breastwork to be constructed in proportion to that
height; a double ditch, fifteen feet wide, to be dug with perpendicular sides;
towers to be raised frequently to the height of three stories, and connected by
bridges laid across and covered, the fronts of which were to be protected by a
wicker breastwork; so that the men might be defended from the enemy by a double
ditch and a double rank of defenders,
4 quorum alter ex pontibus, quo tutior altitudine
esset, hoc audacius longiusque permitteret tela, alter, qui propior hostem in
ipso vallo collocatus esset, ponte ab incidentibus telis tegeretur. Portis
fores altioresque turres imposuit.
4 one of which, from the bridges, being safer
because of its height, might cast missiles more boldly and farther; the other,
stationed nearer the enemy on the rampart itself, would be protected from
falling missiles by the bridge. He placed gates and higher towers at the
entrances.
[10]
1 Huius munitionis duplex erat consilium.
Namque et operum magnitudinem et timorem suum sperabat fiduciam barbaris
allaturum, et cum pabulatum frumentatumque longius esset proficiscendum, parvis
copiis castra munitione ipsa videbat posse defendi.
1 There was a twofold purpose to this
fortification. For he hoped that both the size of the works and his own
apparent fear would inspire confidence in the barbarians, and he saw that, when
it was necessary to go farther for fodder and grain, the camp could be defended
by the fortification itself with a small force.
2 Interim crebro paucis utrimque
procurrentibus inter bina castra palude interiecta contendebatur; quam tamen
paludem nonnumquam aut nostra auxilia Gallorum Germanorumque transibant
acriusque hostes insequebantur, aut vicissim hostes eadem transgressi nostros
longius summovebant.
2 Meanwhile, frequent skirmishes occurred as
small groups from either side rushed forward between the two camps, with a
marsh lying in between; this marsh was sometimes crossed by our auxiliaries of
Gauls and Germans, who pursued the enemy more vigorously, or in turn by the
enemy, who, having crossed the same, drove our men back farther.
3 Accidebat autem cotidianis pabulationibus
(id quod accidere erat necesse, cum raris disiectisque ex aedificiis pabulum
conquireretur), ut impeditis locis dispersi pabulatores circumvenirentur;
3 It happened also during the daily foraging
expeditions (which was inevitable, since fodder was being gathered from
scattered and isolated buildings), that the foragers, dispersed in difficult
terrain, were surrounded;
4 quae res, etsi mediocre detrimentum
iumentorum ac servorum nostris adferebat, tamen stultas cogitationes incitabat
barbarorum, atque eo magis, quod Commius, quem profectum ad auxilia Germanorum
arcessenda docui, cum equitibus venerat; qui, tametsi numero non amplius erant
quingenti, tamen Germanorum adventu barbari nitebantur.
4 this, although it brought only moderate loss
of pack animals and slaves to our forces, nevertheless aroused foolish ideas
among the barbarians—and all the more so because Commius, whom I said had gone
to summon German auxiliaries, had returned with cavalry; who, although they
were not more than five hundred in number, still gave the barbarians hope
through the arrival of the Germans.
[11]
1 Caesar, cum animadverteret hostem complures
dies castris palude et loci natura munitis se tenere neque oppugnari castra
eorum sine dimicatione perniciosa nec locum munitionibus claudi nisi a maiore
exercitu posse, litteras ad Trebonium mittit, ut quam celerrime posset legionem
XIII, quae cum T. Sextio legato in Biturigibus hiemabat, arcesseret atque ita
cum tribus legionibus magnis itineribus ad se veniret;
1 Caesar, observing that the enemy for several
days kept to a camp fortified by a marsh and the nature of the ground, and that
their camp could not be attacked without a ruinous engagement, nor could the
place be enclosed with fortifications except by a larger army, sent letters to
Trebonius, instructing him to summon the Thirteenth Legion, which was wintering
with the legate Titus Sextius among the Bituriges, as quickly as possible, and
so come to him with three legions by forced marches;
2 ipse equites in vicem Remorum ac Lingonum
reliquarumque civitatum, quorum magnum numerum evocaverat, praesidio
pabulationibus mittit, qui subitas hostium incursiones sustinerent.
2 he himself, by turns, sent cavalry from the
Remi, Lingones, and other states—of whom he had summoned a large number—as
protection for the foraging parties, to withstand sudden attacks from the
enemy.
[12]
1 Quod cum cotidie fieret ac iam consuetudine
diligentia minueretur, quod plerumque accidit diuturnitate, Bellovaci delecta
manu peditum cognitis stationibus cotidianis equitum nostrorum
1 When this occurred daily and vigilance was
already diminishing through habit, as generally happens with long duration, the
Bellovaci, with a chosen band of infantry, having learned the daily stations of
our cavalry,
2 silvestribus locis insidias disponunt
eodemque equites postero die mittunt, qui primum elicerent nostros, deinde
circumventos aggrederentur.
2 laid ambushes in wooded areas, and sent
cavalry the next day to the same place, who would first lure our men out, then
attack them once surrounded.
3 Cuius mali sors incidit Remis, quibus ille
dies fungendi muneris obvenerat. Namque hi, cum repente hostium equites
animadvertissent ac numero superiores paucitatem contempsissent, cupidius
insecuti peditibus undique sunt circumdati.
3 The misfortune fell to the Remi, whose turn
it was that day to perform the duty. For they, having suddenly noticed the
enemy cavalry and, being superior in number, having scorned their small force,
pursued too eagerly and were surrounded on all sides by infantry.
4 Quo facto perturbati celerius quam
consuetudo fert equestris proeli se receperunt amisso Vertisco, principe
civitatis, praefecto equitum;
4 This having happened, they retreated more
quickly than is usual in a cavalry fight, having lost Vertiscus, chief of the
state and commander of the cavalry;
5 qui cum vix equo propter aetatem posset uti,
tamen consuetudine Gallorum neque aetatis excusatione in suscipienda
praefectura usus erat neque dimicari sine se voluerat.
5 who, though he could scarcely make use of a
horse due to his age, yet by Gallic custom had neither used his age as an
excuse for declining the command, nor had he wished the battle to be fought
without him.
6 Inflantur atque incitantur hostium animi
secundo proelio, principe et praefecto Remorum interfecto,
6 The spirits of the enemy were inflated and
stirred by this successful battle, with the chief and commander of the Remi
slain,
7 nostrique detrimento admonentur diligentius
exploratis locis stationes disponere ac moderatius cedentem insequi
hostem.
7 and our men were reminded by the loss to
station their outposts more carefully after reconnoitering the ground, and to
pursue a retreating enemy more moderately.
[13]
1 Non intermittunt interim cotidiana proelia
in conspectu utrorumque castrorum, quae ad vada transitusque fiebant
paludis.
1 Meanwhile, daily skirmishes continued
without interruption in sight of both camps, occurring at the fords and
crossings of the marsh.
2 Qua contentione Germani, quos propterea
Caesar traduxerat Rhenum ut equitibus interpositi proeliarentur, cum
constantius universi paludem transissent paucisque resistentibus interfectis
pertinacius reliquam multitudinem essent insecuti, perterriti non solum ei qui
aut comminus opprimebantur aut eminus vulnerabantur, sed etiam qui longius
subsidiari consuerant, turpiter refugerunt,
2 In this contest, the Germans—whom Caesar had
brought across the Rhine for the purpose of fighting intermingled with the
cavalry—when they crossed the marsh more steadily as a group and, having killed
a few who resisted, pursued the rest of the multitude more stubbornly, struck
terror not only into those who were being overwhelmed in close combat or
wounded from afar, but also into those who had usually come up as support from
a distance, and they fled disgracefully,
3 nec prius finem fugae fecerunt saepe amissis
superioribus locis quam se aut in castra suorum reciperent, aut nonnulli pudore
coacti longius profugerent.
3 nor did they end their flight—often after
losing higher ground—until they either retreated into their own camp, or some,
driven by shame, fled even farther.
4 Quorum periculo sic omnes copiae sunt
perturbatae ut vix iudicari posset, utrum secundis minimisque rebus
insolentiores an adverso mediocri casu timidiores essent.
4 By the danger of these men, the entire force
was so disturbed that it was scarcely possible to determine whether they were
more insolent in the least successes, or more fearful in moderate
adversity.
[14]
1 Compluribus diebus isdem in castris
consumptis, cum propius accessisse legiones et Gaium Trebonium legatum
cognossent, duces Bellovacorum veriti similem obsessionem Alesiae noctu
dimittunt eos quos aut aetate aut viribus inferiores aut inermes habebant,
unaque reliqua impedimenta.
1 After several days had been spent in the
same camp, when they learned that the legions and Gaius Trebonius the legate
had come closer, the leaders of the Bellovaci, fearing a siege like that at
Alesia, by night sent away those whom they deemed inferior in age or strength
or unarmed, along with their remaining baggage.
2 Quorum perturbatum et confusum dum explicant
agmen (magna enim multitudo carrorum etiam expeditos sequi Gallos consuevit),
oppressi luce copias armatorum pro suis instruunt castris, ne prius Romani
persequi se inciperent quam longius agmen impedimentorum suorum
processisset.
2 While they were deploying their disordered
and confused column (for a great multitude of wagons usually followed even
unencumbered Gauls), and were overtaken by daylight, they drew up their armed
forces in front of their camp, so that the Romans might not begin pursuit
before their baggage train had gone farther ahead.
3 At Caesar neque resistentes adgrediendos
tanto collis ascensu iudicabat, neque non usque eo legiones admovendas ut
discedere ex eo loco sine periculo barbari militibus instantibus non
possent.
3 But Caesar judged that those resisting
should not be attacked on so steep an ascent of the hill, yet that the legions
must be brought up close enough so that the barbarians could not depart from
that place without danger from the pressing soldiers.
4 Ita, cum palude impedita a castris castra
dividi videret, quae transeundi difficultas celeritatem insequendi tardare
posset, atque id iugum quod trans paludem paene ad hostium castra pertineret mediocri
valle a castris eorum intercisum animum adverteret, pontibus palude constrata
legiones traducit celeriterque in summam planitiem iugi pervenit, quae declivi
fastigio duobus ab lateribus muniebatur.
4 Therefore, seeing that the camps were
separated by a marsh difficult to cross, which might delay the speed of
pursuit, and noticing that a ridge which extended almost to the enemy camp
across the marsh was cut off from it by a moderate valley, he laid bridges
across the marsh, led the legions over, and quickly reached the highest plain
of the ridge, which was protected on both flanks by sloping ground.
5 Ibi legionibus instructis ad ultimum iugum
pervenit aciemque eo loco constituit unde tormento missa tela in hostium cuneos
conici possent.
5 There, having drawn up the legions, he
reached the farthest ridge and positioned his battle line in such a place that
missiles discharged from artillery could be hurled into the enemy’s ranks.
[15]
1 Barbari confisi loci natura, cum dimicare
non recusarent, si forte Romani subire collem conarentur, paulatim copias
distributas dimittere non possent, ne dispersi perturbarentur, in acie
permanserunt.
1 The barbarians, trusting in the nature of
the ground, although not refusing to fight if the Romans should attempt to
climb the hill, could not gradually dismiss their distributed forces, lest they
become disordered if scattered, and so they remained in battle formation.
2 Quorum pertinacia cognita Caesar XX
cohortibus instructis castrisque eo loco mutatis muniri iubet castra.
2 Learning of their obstinacy, Caesar, with
twenty cohorts drawn up and the camp relocated to that spot, ordered
fortification of the new camp.
3 Absolutis operibus pro vallo legiones
instructas collocat, equites frenatis equis in statione disponit.
3 With the works completed, he stationed the
legions in formation before the rampart, and posted the cavalry with bridled
horses on guard.
4 Bellovaci, cum Romanos ad insequendum
paratos viderent neque pernoctare aut diutius permanere sine periculo eodem
loco possent, tale consilium sui recipiendi ceperunt.
4 The Bellovaci, seeing the Romans prepared to
pursue, and that they could neither stay overnight nor remain longer in that
place without danger, devised the following plan for their withdrawal.
5 Fasces, ut consueverant (namque in acie
sedere Gallos consuesse superioribus commentariis Caesaris declaratum est), per
manus stramentorum ac virgultorum, quorum summa erat in castris copia, inter se
traditos ante aciem collocarunt extremoque tempore diei signo pronuntiato uno
tempore incenderunt.
5 They arranged, as was their custom (for
Caesar had stated in previous commentaries that the Gauls were accustomed to
sit in battle formation), bundles of straw and brushwood, of which there was a
great quantity in the camp, passed from hand to hand and placed in front of
their line; and at the end of the day, with a signal given, they set them
alight all at once.
6 Ita continens flamma copias omnes repente a
conspectu texit Romanorum. Quod ubi accidit, barbari vehementissimo cursu
refugerunt.
6 Thus, a continuous flame suddenly concealed
all their troops from the sight of the Romans. When this occurred, the
barbarians fled at full speed.
[16]
1 Caesar, etsi discessum hostium animadvertere
non poterat incendiis oppositis, tamen id consilium cum fugae causa initum
suspicaretur, legiones promovet, turmas mittit ad insequendum; ipse veritus
insidias, ne forte in eodem loco subsistere hostis atque elicere nostros in
locum conaretur iniquum, tardius procedit.
1 Caesar, although he could not perceive the
enemy’s departure because of the fires placed in the way, nevertheless,
suspecting that this plan had been adopted for the purpose of flight, advanced
the legions and sent out cavalry squadrons to pursue; he himself, fearing
ambushes—lest the enemy perhaps remain in the same place and try to lure our
men into unfavorable ground—advanced more slowly.
2 Equites cum intrare fumum et flammam
densissimam timerent ac, si qui cupidius intraverant, vix suorum ipsi priores
partes animadverterent equorum, insidias veriti liberam facultatem sui
recipiendi Bellovacis dederunt.
2 The cavalry, since they feared to enter the
thickest smoke and fire, and, if any had gone in too eagerly, could scarcely
see even the front parts of their own horses, feared ambushes and gave the
Bellovaci free opportunity to retreat.
4 Ita fuga timoris simul calliditatisque plena
sine ullo detrimento milia non amplius decem progressi hostes loco munitissimo
castra posuerunt.
4 Thus, in a flight full of both fear and
cunning, without any loss, the enemy, having advanced not more than ten miles,
pitched camp in a very strongly fortified location.
5 Inde cum saepe in insidiis equites
peditesque disponerent, magna detrimenta Romanis in pabulationibus
inferebant.
5 From there, by frequently placing cavalry
and infantry in ambush, they inflicted great losses on the Romans during
foraging operations.
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[17]
1 Quod cum crebrius accideret, ex captivo
quodam comperit Caesar Correum, Bellovacorum ducem, fortissimorum milia sex
peditum delegisse equitesque ex omni numero mille, quos in insidiis eo loco
collocaret, quem in locum propter copiam frumenti ac pabuli Romanos missuros
suspicaretur.
1 When this happened more frequently, Caesar
learned from a certain captive that Correus, the leader of the Bellovaci, had
selected six thousand of their bravest infantry and one thousand cavalry from
the whole force, to station in ambush at a location where he suspected the
Romans would send troops because of the abundance of grain and fodder.
2 Quo cognito consilio legiones plures quam
solebat educit equitatumque, qua consuetudine pabulatoribus mittere praesidio
consuerat, praemittit: huic interponit auxilia levis armaturae; ipse cum
legionibus quam potest maxime appropinquat.
2 Having learned of this plan, he led out more
legions than usual and sent ahead the cavalry, which he was accustomed to send
as a guard for the foragers; to this he added auxiliaries of light-armed
troops; he himself approached as close as he could with the legions.